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ABSTRACT 
 
Title of Dissertation: A Selective Study on Effectiveness of International    
Legislation on Maritime Security: Gulf of Guinea A Case   
Study  
 
Degree:  MSc 
 
The dissertation is a selective study on effective international legislation to enhance 
maritime security globally.  It compares the effectiveness of the international legal 
regimes among member States and the Gulf of Guinea countries in combating piracy, 
armed robbery and terrorism against ships.   
 
A brief look is taken at the present maritime security rules and regulations as well as 
their evolvement over the years.  The definition of maritime security and the role of 
the ISPS Code 2002 in the global war on terror are examined, while considering the 
state of the economy and maritime domain awareness in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
The effectiveness of international legislation and its impacts on enhancing maritime 
security are investigated.  Concerns from IMO member States on achieving uniform 
standards in enforcing the security regimes are explored with a view to ascertaining 
the manner in which the regulations can best be used to combat acts of piracy, 
armed robbery and terrorism.  Particular reference is made to the USA maritime 
security initiatives, CMI Model Law and multinational coalition naval forces in 
maritime security operations. 
 
Implementation of the range of provisions in the UNCLOS, SUA Convention and 
ISPS Code on enhancing maritime security in developed and developing countries, 
together with their constraints are explored.  Several factors are identified as 
hindering the effectiveness of the Code in the countries in the Gulf of Guinea, 
particularly in Nigeria.  These constraints are analyzed, to find a way forward in the 
effective implementation of the ISPS Code and other regulatory regimes in the region. 
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Additionally, the current trend in the increase of acts of piracy and terrorism globally, 
as reported by the IMB, the maritime security assessment and responses by member 
States were noted for comparison.  The provisions in the regulatory regimes were 
collated and evaluated on enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
The concluding chapters examine the results of the assessment of ISPS Code in the 
Gulf of Guinea and discuss the strategies for effectiveness of the Code in the region, 
particularly in Nigeria.  Conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made 
concerning the need for domestication of the ISPS Code and other international legal 
regimes for effective maritime security in Nigeria.     
 
KEYWORDS: Effectiveness, international Legislation, UNCLOS, SUA Convention, 
SOLAS Convention, ISPS Code, Maritime Security, Gulf of Guinea, Nigeria. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Background 
 
The success of maritime security depends largely on the ability of nations to provide 
adequate legal regimes in support of the shipping industry.  Sea transportation is as 
old as civilization itself and commercial shipping probably began in the 
Mediterranean Sea where the Merchants of Phoenicia owned ships and traded 
widely.  Progressively, the design of ships has moved from those rowed and sailed to 
the diesel, steam and gas turbines as well as nuclear-powered vessels of today.  Not 
only has the propulsion engine power increased, but also the total carrying capacity.  
According to the World Trade Organization (WTO, 2005, P.271), about 90 per cent of 
the annual global trade by volume is moved by ships.  
 
Being a complex system with very high technological architecture, the ship is one of 
the most ingenious inventions of man.  A modern design is an integration of complex 
systems in separated and modular forms which include the components of propulsion, 
communication, navigation equipment as well as accommodation systems among 
others.  The use of them for transporting of passengers and bulk goods is one of the 
cheapest modes of transportation.  Despite the economic benefits derived from their 
use for transportation of goods and services, there are also some challenges, the 
most significant of which are maritime safety and security.   
 
Recent events in the world have raised the concern of the international community 
regarding the safety and security of ships at sea.  Piracy, armed robbery and 
terrorism and insurgency have constituted the greatest threat to maritime security.  
According to the report of International maritime Organization (IMO, 2009), the surge 
on the act of piracy globally is attributable to the increase in piratical attacks in the 
Gulf of Aden in the Indian Ocean.  The report shows also there has been an increase 
in piratical attacks in the Gulf of Guinea since 1982.  Resulting from the effort of 
Japan in the newly-formed Regional Cooperation Agreement on Anti-Piracy 
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(ReCAAP) in the Southeast Asia and Malasia, Singapore and Indonesia in the 
MALSINDO Initiatives in Straits of Malacca; there is a remarkable reduction of piracy 
and armed robbery against ships in the waters within this region of the South China 
Sea and Indian Ocean. 
 
Similar reports indicate an increase in the acts of terrorism in the world, starting from 
the incident in 1985 which involved the passenger ship Achillo Lauro that was 
hijacked by terrorist in the Mediterranean.  Thereafter, there have been terrorist 
attacks on US Navy Ship (USS) Cole at Aden Yemen on October 2000, Merchant 
Tanker (MT) Limburg off the coast of Yemen on October 2002 and Super ferry 14 in 
Philippine waters on February 2004.  The uppermost concern for maritime security 
was expressed over the incident of terrorism in the United States (US) on 11 
September 2001 (9/11), which involved the use of passenger airlines.  In its wake 
was the incident in Madrid on 11 March 2004 in which commercial trains were also 
the target of terrorism.  The global concern with maritime security is based on the 
premise that terrorists, having already targeted air and rail successfully, would exploit 
the use of commercial ships.  If this were to be the case, the consequences of such 
an act would be enormous considering the population density at the seaports and the 
global economic reach of the sea. 
 
In order to reposition the maritime industry to ensure successful trading and 
continuous economic growth in the world, the United Nations (UN) and the IMO have 
developed a legal framework to address the issues of safety and security at sea.  
Among the legislation are the International Convention on Safety of Life at Sea (1974) 
As Amended and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982).  Others 
are International Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety 
of Marine Navigation and Protocol (1988) as well as the International Ship and Port 
Facility Security Code (2002). 
 
1.2. Statement of the Problem 
 
Shipping and its socio-economic effect on global trade are under increasing threats.  
The report of the International Maritime Bureau (IMB, 2009), a specialized division of 
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), states that the rate of crimes is 
increasing in the maritime industry.  Specifically, the number of piratical attacks on 
ships has recently risen tremendously in the Gulf of Aden off the coasts of Somalia 
and Yemen.  From the IMB report, the number of piratical attacks increased from 48 
 2
in 2007 to 111 in 2008, which is over 100 per cent increase.  This is despite the 
existence of the international community legislation and coalition armed forces to 
combat crimes at sea.  It is in the light of this global increase in maritime crimes such 
as terrorism and piracy that this study is being conducted, to establish the 
effectiveness of the international legal regimes in enhancing maritime security. 
1.3. Objectives of the Study 
 
The broad aim of this study is to examine the effectiveness of international legal 
framework on maritime security.  The specific objectives will be to: 
 
• Identify the threats to maritime security and its relationship with the 
international legislation. 
• Examine the impact of maritime security threats on the shipping industry. 
• Critically analyze the international legal regimes for enhancing maritime 
security. 
• Evaluate the effects of the international legal regimes using data and trend 
analyses. 
• Identify the constraints of the international legal regimes that have militated 
against ensuring maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea. 
• Proffer strategies for the effective implementation of the maritime security 
legislation the Gulf of Guinea.    
  
1.4. Significance of the Study 
 
In examining data on breaches of maritime security, the study seeks to bring to light 
the trends that can be associated with security legislation and the ISPS Code in 
particular.  It is intended that such data analyses and critical evaluation of the legal 
instruments will assist in improving policy-making for maritime security at the 
international, regional and local levels. 
1.5. Scope 
 
The dissertation will highlight the trend in the international regime for providing 
security at sea in the past 15 years.  This period is divided into 2 phases.  The first 
phase is the period between 1994 and 2001 during which the UNCLOS and SUA 
Convention came into force.  The second phase is the period between 2002          
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and 2009 when the SOLAS Chapter XI As Amended and ISPS Code 2002 came also 
into force.  This development in the legislation is to adequately address the 
differences on the issues of maritime security and safety.      
 
1.6. Methodology 
 
The international legislative regimes which have been developed over the years to 
enhance maritime security will be critically analyzed using statistical approach.  
Among the legal regimes to be analyzed are UNCLOS, SUA Convention and 
Protocol, SOLAS Convention and the ISPS Code.   
 
Data on threats to maritime security will be gathered from both primary and 
secondary sources.  The primary data will be predominantly gathered from the IMB, a 
non-profit making organization established in 1981 to act as a focal point in the fight 
against all types of maritime crime and malpractice.  The data from this organization 
seem therefore to be reasonably unbiased and is arguably the entity with the most 
significant data collection of unlawful acts at sea.  Other data are from the Nigerian 
Shippers Council (NSC) as well as information and literature review sources 
including the Internet.  Furthermore, the study will adopt quantitative methods and 
statistical approaches in analyzing the data.   
1.7. Limitations 
 
The limitation of this research was the dearth of up-to-date on maritime security in 
the countries of West Africa, particularly in Nigeria.  This is to a large extent due to 
the low level of maritime domain awareness in the region.  However, information 
obtained from senior officers in the maritime industry and the data from the IMB are 
crucial to this study, so this limitation did not significantly affect the outcome of the 
study.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
CONCEPT OF MARITIME SECURITY 
 
This section will undertake the review of the literature relevant to the study and will 
provide a theoretical framework on which the work is based.  The concept of 
maritime security will be discussed to establish a common definition that will be 
adopted throughout the study.  It look at concepts on the threats to security such as 
piracy, armed robbery, terrorism, insurgency and other organized crimes at sea as 
well as the concept of maritime zones delimitation.  It will also examine the literature 
in law to define the term code which will be appropriate for the understanding of the 
ISPS Code in the context of maritime security.    
 
2.1. Maritime Security 
 
The Marine Encyclopaedic Dictionary (2005) defines “maritime” as pertaining to the 
sea, to navigation, to shipping commerce and bordering on the sea.  Ma (2008) 
states broadly that maritime covers many aspects related to the sea often beyond 
purely transportation. Also, the USA Department of Homeland Security (DHS, 2005) 
defines maritime as a domain covering all the areas and things bordering on a sea 
and other navigational waterways including all sea-related activities, infrastructure, 
people, cargo, vessels and other conveyances.  These definitions of maritime will 
suffice in this paper, but it will include all human and commercial activities carried out 
in harbours and at sea which would require a secure environment.     
 
The definition of security is as wide and complex as its concept.  Some scholars 
maintain that safety and security are synonymous, since both refer to a state of being 
safe from fear, danger, anxiety and uncertainty.  Other scholars insist that the words 
are distinct from each other.  It is to underline the distinction between safety and 
security that Mejia (2003, p.154) opined that from a linguistic perspective, both words 
as expressed in some languages may lead to terminological confusion.  For example 
in French, the words safety and security are expressed in a word “securite”, while in 
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Spanish both words are expressed in the word “seguridad”.  Both of these languages 
are among the 6 official languages within the UN system.  On the other hand in 
English, the 2 words are expressed literally in different as well as distinct terms.   
 
In order to resolve the confusion arising from the meaning of safety and security, due 
to differences in the languages of the world, the international community has agreed 
to distinguish between their meanings.  This is to ensure a global uniformity in the 
definitions.  Mejia et al (2005, p.34) define maritime safety as those measures 
employed by maritime administrations, vessel owners and operators, port facilities, 
offshore installations and other maritime organizations to prevent as well as minimize 
the occurrence of accidents at sea. 1   However, the term “maritime safety” is in 
contrast with the term “maritime security” being used at IMO, indicating the terms are 
quite distinct in meaning.  Therefore, Mejia et al define maritime security as those 
measures employed by administrations, vessel owners and operators, port facilities, 
offshore installations and other maritime organizations to protect against unlawful 
acts such as piracy, armed robbery, terrorism as well as other maritime crimes.   
 
In addition to these definitions, therefore, by maritime safety this paper implies all the 
measures taken to protect the ship and its crew from accidents occurring within the 
operational activities onboard ships due to propulsion control machinery failure and 
navigational error among others.  Similarly, maritime security would imply all 
measures taken to protect the ship and its crew from attacks from external agents 
during the ship’s operations.   
 
2.2. Maritime Security Threats 
 
The list of threats to maritime security is long and new trends keep evolving globally.  
From the foregoing definitions, the threats are human illegal activities employed to 
militate against the measures taken to ensure maritime security.  Among these 
threats are piracy and armed robbery against ships, terrorism, insurgency and 
smuggling.  Others are human and drug trafficking, arms running, stowaways, 
counterfeit and fraud.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 The accidents could result from substandard ships, unqualified crew and operator error. 
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2.3. Piracy 
 
Over the years, the oceans of the world have a long history of maritime piracy.  
People have been romanticising piracy as the Robin Hoods of the Sea.  Pirates are 
seen as likeable bearded characters who steal from the rich to give to the poor.  In 
reality, it is quite different: piracy is a violent and bloody attack targeted on 
defenceless people onboard merchant vessels.  Currently, the acts of piracy are 
been carried out with sophisticated weapons and  at coastal waters, making them to 
deviate from their original meaning as acts being carried out for personal financial 
gains at high sea.  According to Article 101 of UNCLOS 1982, piracy consists of any 
of the following acts: 
 
 (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation,  
committed for private ends by the crew or the passenger of a private 
ship or a private aircraft and directed: 
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against 
persons or property onboard such ship or aircraft; 
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside 
the jurisdiction of any State; 
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an 
aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; 
(c) any act of inciting or intentionally facilitating an act described in 
subparagraph (a) and (b).       
 
This Article goes further to state the five elements of an act of piracy which are as 
follows: (1) an act of violence crime resulting to assault, rape and murder among 
others; (2) an act committed on the high seas or places outside the jurisdiction of any 
State; (3) an act involving the use of a ship to attack another ship, excluding mutiny 
and barratry; (4) an act committed for private ends, which excludes the acts of 
terrorism and environmental damage activities. (5) an act by the crew or passengers 
of a privately owned ship which excludes attack from a naval ship.  This UNCLOS 
definition of acts of piracy is narrow considering that it fails to cover some of the 
current acts of piracy.  When one considers the piratical attacks in the region of the 
Gulf of Guinea, it is clear that most of these attacks occur within the 12 nautical miles 
which is in the territorial waters limit.  This is in contrast to the high seas limit.  
Another contrasting aspect is that the definition regards the act of piracy as being 
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carried out for “private ends”. In some incidents, the intentions of the pirates may not 
be easy to differentiate between being for “private ends” and “public ends”.2   
 
According to Murphy (2007, p.159), the requirement that a pirate act had to be 
committed for “private ends” had its origin in the distinction between piracy and 
privateering.  Actually, privateers were pirates under license by the States.  During 
piratical attacks, the privateers were not engaged in unwarranted brutality and lack of 
witnesses.  This is because they would have to justify the piratical attacks before a 
Prize Court to establish a rightful claim to the stolen goods.  States authorized 
privateering in as much as it is used against foreign and local ships perceived as 
enemies, in which case it substitutes for the navy.   
 
On the other hand, piracy was not under license and its acts were always against 
States.  The pirates attack their victims with outermost brutality and eliminate all 
signs of witnesses as they did not owe any justification of their piracy acts to the 
State.  As a matter of fact, it was because of these reasons that the act of piracy was 
described as being for “private ends”.  This meant that the acts of piracy were for the 
selfishness of the pirates, unlike in the acts of privateering, which was in the interest 
of both the privateers and the States.             
 
Furthermore, the intention of the pirates for financial gain in the acts of piracy is 
difficult to be separated from socio-political gains.  In this regard, IMB defines, 
broadly, piracy as an act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any 
other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.  
This definition is wider and covers any illegal boarding of the ship both in harbour and 
at sea, but it has no international legal standing.  However, this paper will expand the 
“private ends” requirement to mean “without authorization from any State”, in the act 
of piracy.  
 
2.4. Armed Robbery 
 
In order to expand the narrow definition of piracy as defined in the UNCLOS 1982, 
the IMO has adopted the term “piracy and armed robbery against ships” in its non-
treaty IMO documents.  Accordingly, IMO defines armed robbery against ships as 
“any unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, 
                                                 
2 To the victims of piratical attacks, the well organized groups of pirates are public enemies and their 
intentions are for public ends and not for private ends.     
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other than an act of ‘piracy’, directed against a ship or against persons or property 
onboard such a ship, within a State’s jurisdiction over such offences”.  Also, in this 
broad definition, armed robbery against ships can occur in both the territorial waters 
and on the high seas. It is noteworthy that armed robbery is an act of violence and is, 
therefore, categorized as another act of piracy.  Hence, in this paper the two 
concepts will be used in combination with one another as piracy and armed robbery 
against ships.        
2.5. Terrorism 
 
Unlike piracy and other maritime crimes, maritime terrorism was a new phenomenon 
to the shipping industry.  Though the act of maritime terrorism is new, its occurrence 
has not been uniformly reported globally.  As Raymond (2005a, p.182) observed, 
there was a high profile maritime terrorist attack which involved the hijacking of a 
Greek freighter in Karachi in 1974.  However, it was the hijacking of the cruise Liner 
Achille Lauro by a terrorist group in 1985, off the coast of Egypt that attracted the 
attention of the international community to this phenomenon of maritime terrorism. 
 
According to Snoddon (2007, p.228), maritime terrorism can be defined as “any 
unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against people or property to 
coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious or 
ideological objectives”.  Raymond (2005, p.181) defines maritime terrorism as any 
illegal act directed against ships, their passengers, cargo or crew, or against sea 
ports with the intent of directly or indirectly influencing, for political purposes, a 
government or groups of individuals”.  From these definitions, it can be clearly seen 
that not only is piracy distinguishable from maritime terrorism but also the two 
phenomena are linked together.  Maritime terrorism is differentiated from piracy; 
while the former acts with the intent for political gains, the latter acts with the intent 
for private gains.  On the other hand, they are linked by the fact that a terrorist group 
could employ the act of piracy for financial gain to support the acts of terror.           
2.6. Insurgency 
 
Hansen (2009, p.77) defines insurgency as a protracted political-military activity 
directed towards completely or partially controlling the resources of a country through 
the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.  As irregular 
military forces, the insurgents engage in guerrilla combat against the regular armed 
forces of a country.  In this unconventional armed conflict, the insurgency groups 
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could employ the use of piracy and terrorist attacks for the advancement of their 
cause.  For the purpose of this paper, therefore, insurgency is defined as an 
organized movement aimed at obtaining autonomy for certain geographical areas 
from a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict.     
 
2.7. Organized Crime 
 
There are many criminal activities which are conducted in the marine environment.  
Included in the organized crimes are smuggling, thefts, human and drug trafficking, 
arms running and fraud among others.  Although the organized crimes are as 
important as other unlawful acts in breach of maritime security, the analysis of the 
impacts of organized crimes on the shipping industry as regards the ISPS Code will 
be excluded in this paper.  This is to provide enough time to analyze adequately the 
impacts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, terrorism and insurgency on the 
shipping industry, since these attacks usually inflict serious injury or death to persons 
within the maritime domain. 
 
2.8. Maritime Zones 
 
Earlier, the international community has attempted to draw lines that could define the 
boundary limits of coastal States in the oceans of the world.  The delimitation of 
maritime zones has been disputed among nations as a result of probable 
infringement on sovereignty, economy and off-shore resources control among others.  
In order to resolve some of these issues, the UNCLOS 1982 has demarcated a 
nation’s maritime domain into four zones.  These zones are high seas, exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), contiguous zone and territorial waters which are shown in 
Figure 1.  
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Figure 1 - The Delimitation of Maritime Zones Worldwide 
Deep Sea Bed 
Continental Shelf 
High Seas 
12 miles Territorial Sea 
24 miles Contiguous Zone 
200 miles 
Exclusive Economic Zone
Land 
Source:  Fisheries and Oceans Canada (2003).  A description of Canada’s maritime zones.  
Retrieved July 8, 2009 from the World Wide Web: 
http:/www.dfo-mpo.gc.ca/oceans/canadasoceans-oceansducanada/marinezones-
zonesmarines-eng.htm 
 
The territorial water is the zone consisting of 12 nautical miles from the baseline of 
the coastal State.  This zone is considered part of the territorial integrity of the coastal 
State and therefore its national law supersedes any other international law.  The 
contiguous zone is defined as the zone extending from the edge of the territorial 
water at a distance of 24 nautical miles from the baseline.  Within this zone, the 
coastal State has jurisdiction in enforcing its national law in the areas of pollution, 
taxation, custom and immigration.  Also, the EEZ is the zone extending beyond the 
contiguous zone, at a distance of 200 nautical miles from the coastal baseline.  In 
this zone, the coastal State has the sole rights for the exploitation of the natural 
resources such as fishing and oil exploration as well as production.  Furthermore, the 
high sea is defined as the zone measured seaward beyond the EEZ.  This zone of 
the sea is the international waters which are under universal jurisdiction.       
2.9. Legal Code 
 
From history, the code is probably the earliest form of legislation.  For example, 
between 2200 and 1600 B.C., there was the Babylonian Code of Hammurabi.  This 
Code was a compilation of the Sumerian customs and practices in the Tigris-
Euphrates basin.3   Mukherjee (2002, p.47) points out that a code is the vehicle 
through which custom transforms into law.  However, it was seen that this may not 
always be the case, as with the Hindu Code or Law of Manu which dictated, rather, 
                                                 
3 Edgar Gold, in his treatise on ‘maritime transport’, observed that Tigris-Euphrates was the cradle of 
western law and civilization. 
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what the law should be.  Therefore, it is understood that codes could transform 
customs and practices into law as well as prescribe what the law should be, 
depending on the instances.   
 
The code plays a vital role in civil law jurisdictions, similar to the role legislation plays 
in the common law jurisdiction.  According to Mukherjee (2002), the word “code” is 
defined in common law jurisdiction as the legislation that confirms through legislation, 
as the will and intent of the legislature, what was hitherto simply within the domain of 
the common law.  It was in this context that IMO codified SOLAS Chapter XI which 
resulted to the ISPS Code the effectiveness of which this paper is to examine. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE IMPACT OF SECURITY THREATS ON THE SHIPPING INDUSTRY  
 
Admittedly, maritime security is one the most significant factors in the new world 
order considering that the sea covers over 70 per cent of the earth surface.  The 
success of transportation by sea has made the nations of the world interdependent.  
Easily, people, goods and services are moved by ships from one place to another 
within a country and from one country to another globally, in what has resulted to be 
known as world globalization.  In the globalization of the world through the sea, the 
safety of the sea lines of communications (SLOCs) for international trade need to be 
sustained.  This is because these SLOCs are vulnerable to threats from acts of 
terrorism as well as piracy and armed robbery against ships among others.   
3.1. Terrorism 
 
The new phenomenon on terrorism started in 1968 when a terrorist group, the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked an EIAL airliner en 
route from Tel Aviv to Rome.  Since then, the number of terrorist groups has 
increased and today there are some 36 terrorist groups dispersed across Europe, 
Central and South America, the Middle East, Africa as well as the Sub-continent and 
Southeast Asia (Herbert-Burns, 2005, p.157).  The list of various organizations 
involved acts of terrorism and piracy is shown at the Table 1.  These groups have 
carried out extremely violent acts for alleged social, economic, political and religious 
reasons among others.  In 2000, the terrorist attack on USS Cole, in the port of 
Yemen seemed to be socio-politically motivated.  Prior to this attack, Bateman (2007, 
p.242) stated that Al Qaeda had claimed that it would attack vital economic centres 
and strategic enterprises of the “Jewish-Christian alliance”, including operations on 
land, at sea and in the air.  
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Table 1 - List of various Terrorist and Pirate Organizations 
Serial Terrorist/Pirate 
Organization 
Geographical 
Location 
Publicity 
Level 
Tactics Employed/ 
Motivation 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) 
1. Abu Sayyaf Group Philippines Low Political/ Financial  
2. Al Qaeda Worldwide  High Political 
3. Egyptian Islamic Jihad  Egypt Medium Political 
4. Euskadi ta Askatasuna Spain/France Medium Political 
5. Gerakan Aceh Merdeka Indonesia Medium Political/ Financial 
6. Hamas Palestine Medium Political 
7. Jemaah Islamiyah Southeast Asia High Political 
8. LTTE Sri Lakan Medium Political/ Financial 
9. MEND Nigeria Medium Political/ Financial  
10. PFLP Palestine High Political 
11. Revolutionary Armed 
Force of Colombia 
Colombia Medium Political/ Financial 
12. Somali Marines Somalia None Financial 
Source: Hansen, H.T. (2009). Distinctions in the Finer Shades of Gray: The “Four Circles 
Model” for Maritime Threat Assessment.  Lloyd’s MIU Handbook of Maritime Security, 
Auerbach Publications. 
 
Whitaker (2002, October) opined that the terrorist attack on the Merchant Tanker (MT) 
Limburg in Yemen waters was economically motivated.  This was implied by Al 
Qaeda’s stated intention to attack Western oil interests: 
  
… By exploding the oil tanker in Yemen, the holy warriors hit the umbilical 
cord and lifeline of the crusader community, reminding the enemy of the 
heavy cost of blood and gravity of losses they will pay as a price for their 
continued aggression on our community and looting of our wealth.4     
 
In both attacks, Al Qaeda has used small and fast dinghy boats as vectors to carry 
Tri-Nitro-Toluene (TNT) explosives estimated to be 100-200 kg.  These boats were 
rammed into the target ships causing massive explosions and damage to the ships 
structure as well as death of some crew members.  These incidents underscore the 
international community concern that terrorist groups could employ the use of ships 
as weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to carry out attacks on coastal states. 
                                                 
4 Statement purportedly from Osama bin Ladan and his cohorts congratulating “the Islamic 
Community” on the attack on tanker Limburg.  
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The attack on the USS Cole was intended to kill human beings onboard the vessel.  
It resulted in the death of 19 crew members while 37 others were injured and the ship 
damaged severely.  In the case of MT Limburg, the attack was conducted to inflict 
huge financial loss to the country as a result of the oil spill of about 90,000 gross tons, 
although a member of the crew was also killed.  It could be concluded therefore that 
the impact of terrorists attacks result not only in loss of life, economic and damage to 
the social system, but also to the degradation of the maritime environment. 
 
Acts of maritime terrorism have continued to occur in the regions of the world, 
especially in the South East Asia and the Indian Sub-continent.  Examples of such 
acts are the sinking of Super ferry 14 in the Philippines and the several attacks on 
merchant ships and Sri Lakan Navy ships by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam 
(LTTE).  However, events have shown that maritime targets would not be the 
preferred choice for acts of terrorism.  Terrorists would prefer targets on land where 
success is most likely such as in the attacks on mass urban transport in London and 
Madrid as well as in Mumbai, which has recently included attacks on hotels and 
hospitals. 
 
3.2. Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships 
 
Banlaoi (2005, p.61) asserted in his study that acts of piracy occur in ports, 
anchorages and at high seas.  Also, he opined that pirates range from opportunistic 
fishermen and common criminals to members of sophisticated Asian crime 
syndicates.  In these situations, the acts of piracy range from the classic boarding 
and hijacking of a merchant vessel on the high seas to the more common act of 
stealing from the ship while it is anchored.  From this study, four types of piracy acts 
were identified.  They are piratical attacks on vessels at anchorage, attacks against 
vessels at territorial waters, hijacking of commercial vessels on high seas and 
kidnapping of crew for ransom.  
 
According to IMB Reports for the past 15 years, an extract of which is at Appendix A, 
there has been drastic increase in the number of piracy and armed robbery against 
ships globally, since 1994.  Appendix B shows the trend analysis of the statistical 
data, within the period from 1994 to 2008.  From the statistics, the highest number of 
piratical attacks recorded was 469 and it occurred in 2000 prior to the 9/11.  Having 
dropped to 335 in 2001, the number peaked again to 445 in 2003 in the aftermath    
of 9/11 and subsequent entering into of stricter ISPS Code; although the Code has 
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been a security measure primarily for counter-terrorism, it can also counter acts of 
piracy and other maritime crimes.  Therefore, the initial drop was temporary; resulting 
more from the global sympathetic mood during the period of 9/11 than the 
effectiveness of existing and new maritime security regimes. 
 
The number of the incidents has skyrocketed in some geographical areas such as 
the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia; in other areas such as the Straits of 
Malacca and Singapore they have decreased significantly.  During this period, the 
Report also indicated an increasing number of piracy incidents in the Gulf of Guinea 
and off the coast of Nigeria in particular.  One of the factors that contributed to the 
reduction of the acts of piracy in the Straits of Malacca is the introduction regional 
cooperation in ensuring maritime security in the region spearheaded by Japan.  The 
Japan’s ReCAAP Initiative has improved the maritime security in Southeast Asia 
tremendously.  Another regional agreement, the MALSINDO, which is a joint naval 
patrolling cooperation between the countries of Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, 
has also contributed to the reduction of piratical attacks in the Straits of Malacca.  
Globally, within the last 2 years, the number of attacks increased from 263, in 2007  
to 293, in 2008 which represents about 11 per cent increase.      
 
Lowry (2009) believes that the cost of piracy acts has increased globally as ransoms 
paid increased from an average of USD 1.2 million in 2007 to USD 1.7 million in 2008.  
This is attributable to the recent increase in acts of piracy off the coast of Somalia.  In 
a statement by Kemp 5 , it seems the duration of ordeals from piracy acts have 
doubled from an average of 40 days in 2007 to 80 days in 2008.  Obviously, the 
increase in the ransoms paid to pirates has resulted in prolonging the ordeals of their 
victims.  Pirates could care less for the ordeals of their victims during negotiations as 
long as the ransoms paid are high.  Therefore, the increase in the number of piratical 
attacks has not only placed a huge financial burden on the world’s economy but also 
prolonged the ordeals of victims.     
3.3. The Link between Piracy and Terrorism 
 
Though the acts of piracy and terrorism are distinct from one another, there is a link 
between them.  Recent developments and incidents around the world suggest that 
this link has been shortened tremendously.  As a result, some experts and policy 
                                                 
5 Alex Kemp is operations manager for NYA International, a specialist subsidiary of Group 4 Security, 
G4S. 
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makers are unsure at what point piracy becomes terrorism.  Banlaoi (2005, p.68) 
states that the Singapore Home Minister asserted that in a crime conducted at sea, it 
is difficult to determine whether it is pirates or terrorists who occupy the ship. 6   
Therefore he is of the opinion that the two acts will be treated alike.  
 
According to Hansen (2009, p.77), an organization could employ a number of tactics 
such as piracy and terrorism acts as distinct ways of achieving their overall strategic 
objectives.  For example, an insurgency organization engages in a guerrilla 
campaign against the military force of a country.  At the same time, it is mounting 
terrorist attacks on public targets as well as conducting a range of illegal activities to 
finance the operations.  The terrorist group, Abu Sayyal Group (ASG), based in the 
Southern Philippines, has followed this type of pattern in its operations in Southeast 
Asia.  It has been linked to hijacking and kidnapping for ransom, including raids from 
the sea on holiday resorts.7  Furthermore, the Movement for the Emancipation of the 
Niger Delta (MEND) and Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Front (NDPSF) in Nigeria 
employ similar tactics of piracy as well as terrorism to achieve its goals.   
 
There are some terrorist groups which have maintained particular tactics of terrorism.  
These groups include Al Qaeda and Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM).  Although Al 
Qaeda’s attack on the USS Cole was a pure act of terrorism, nevertheless, the 
terrorist group employed the tactics of pirates in using a small boat for transportation 
towards its target ships.  However, in this case, the Al Qaeda not only used the boat 
for transportation, but also as a weapon that rammed itself into the USS Cole in the 
Port of Yemen.  The link in this case is that some terrorists groups could employ the 
tactics of piracy to carry out acts of terrorism as well as to raise funds for their illegal 
groups.  Therefore, there is a link between piracy and terrorism as long as the pirates 
collude with terrorists while in some cases terrorists adopt the tactics of pirates in 
their operations.           
 
3.4. Weapons at Sea 
 
The acts of piracy and maritime terrorism are closely related activities involving 
armed violence at sea.  Earlier, pirates used weapons less dangerous such as 
dagger, long knives, machetes, axes, crowbars, clubs and swords.  Today, however, 
                                                 
6 In December 2003, the Singapore Home Minister granted an interview to the Agence France Presse 
where he discussed the theme, “Piracy equals Terrorism in Troubled Waters”.    
7 ASG was accused of the abduction of six workers in Borneo on 7 October 2003. 
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they use more sophisticated and lethal weapons varying from pistol to rocket 
propelled grenade launcher (RPG) as shown at Table 2.   
 
Table 2 - Weapons Used in Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships 
 
Serial 
Name of 
Weapon 
 
Weapon Specifications 
(a) (b) (c) 
1. Pistol Calibre – 9mm; Muzzle velocity – approx 375 m/s; Magazine 
capacity – 10 to 15 rounds. 
2. SMGs Calibre – 9 mm;  Muzzle velocity – approx 400 m/s;  Cyclic 
rate – approx 800 rpm;  Magazine capacity – 20 to 30 
rounds. 
3. AK-47 Assault 
Rifle (Russian) 
Calibre – 7.62 mm;  Muzzle velocity – approx 700 m/s;  
Cyclic rate – approx 600 rpm;  Magazine capacity – 30 
rounds.  Effective range – max 400 m.  
4. AK-47 Assault 
Rifle (Russian) 
Calibre – 5.45 mm;  Muzzle velocity – approx 900 m/s;  
Cyclic rate – approx 600/650 rpm;  Magazine capacity – 30 
rounds.  Effective range – max 500 m.  
5. 56-1 Assault 
Rifle (Chinese) 
Calibre – 7.62 mm;  Muzzle velocity – approx 710 m/s;  
Cyclic rate – approx 600 rpm;  Magazine capacity – 30 
rounds.  Effective range – max 400 m. 
6. M-16 A1/A2/A3 
Assault Rifle  
(USA) 
Calibre – 5.56 mm;  Muzzle velocity – approx 945 m/s;  
Cyclic rate – approx 650/750 rpm;  Magazine capacity – 20 
to 30 rounds.  Effective range – max 460/550 m. 
7. RPG -7 
Launcher 
Warhead – Fin stabilized 40 mm armour piercing, anti 
armour, high explosives and anti personnel grenade;  
Effective range – max 300/920 m (single mobile/area target)   
Source: Herbert-Burns, R. (2007).  In P. Lehr (Ed.), Violence at Sea (p.111). 
Routledge Publication, New York.   
 
Burnet (2002) reveals that officers from the Royal Malaysian Marine Police (RMMP) 
have encountered pirates in the shipping lanes in the Malacca Straits having same 
tactical competence and weapons similar to the ones used by members of the 
Indonesian Navy.  This was based on the fact that some M-16 assault rifles 
recovered were in common use by the Indonesian Navy.  However is this case, the 
fact remains that these weapons are readily available anywhere in the world and can 
be purchased accordingly.  Also, the weapons have been proliferated to the extent 
that organized criminals could acquire them from the black market with relative ease.  
Furthermore, the use of assault rifles, sub-machine guns (SMG), rocket-propelled 
grenade launchers (RPGs) and water-borne improvised explosive devices (WBIEDs) 
has made acts of pirates to be indistinguishable from those of terrorism.  This 
sophistication in use of weapons contrasted the earlier ones, when pirates used 
weapons less dangerous such as dagger and crowbars among others.   
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In addition to mastery of weapons, the pirates and terrorists are also skilful and 
experienced in ship handling.  This is an indication that the perpetrators of these 
crimes could also belong to families of fishermen from where they have gained the 
sea experience.  For example, it has been stated that the LTTE attacks on merchant 
vessels and Sri Lakan warships were possible because many Tamil Tigers were 
formally fishermen.  Consequent upon these facts, the acts of terrorism and piracy 
have become sophisticated globally.  Therefore, there is need for the proliferation of 
these weapons to be checked and controlled at sea to ensure maritime security.  
    
3.5. Threats to Ships 
 
According to Chalk (2009, p.118), security threats to ships affects approximately 
112,000 merchant vessels which are parts of the contemporary international maritime 
transport system.  In this system, these ships are the link to about 225 coastal 
nations, dependent territories and island states, while the transport system wide-
ranging network caters for about 80 per cent of commercial freight.  Among the ships 
vulnerable to pirates’ and terrorists’ attacks in the transport system are container 
ships, cruise liners and passenger ferries.  However, ships using the international 
maritime transport system would be incomplete without including naval ships.  It is 
therefore important that warships are included in the network of international 
maritime transport system susceptible to attack. 
 
Bateman (2007, p.243) stated that the sinking of Super ferry 14 in February 2004, 
near Manila in the Philippines, which resulted in the death of 116 people, has been 
the most serious act of maritime terrorism.  This attack was carried out by the 
terrorist group, ASG.  Undoubtedly, pirates and terrorists target both merchant ships 
and warships among which are the MT Limburg and USS Cole.  In the case of MT 
Limburg, one crew member was killed while that of USS Cole resulted in the death of 
nineteen crew members.  It is noteworthy that the number of human lives lost in the 
incident of Super ferry 14 is far greater than the number lost in the combined 
incidents of USS Cole and MT Limburg.  Globally, however, the incidents of USS 
Cole and MT Limburg have attracted more attention than that of Super ferry 14.  This 
is because both were initiated by Al Qaeda and occurred in the context of 9/11. 
 
In addition, the likelihood of attacks on a passenger ferry is higher than on a cruise 
liner, tanker and warship.  This is because of the large number of people who    
would employ the services of ferries which are cheap and highly accessible.       
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Chalk (2007, p.123) insists that the mode of transport by ferry is quite reliable and is 
also a cost-effective alternative to flying.  This has made many people use it as a 
principal means of transportation both internationally and nationally.  Additionally, in 
some designs, the roll-on roll-off (ro-ro) ships could carry cars, tourist coaches, buses, 
minivans and freight trucks.  Chalk (2009. p.124) stresses that the high number of 
passengers and large volume of embarking traffic would make it practically difficult to 
take extant security measures at the terminals without the impact of disruption, unlike 
the situation of cruise liners.  Nevertheless, as with cruise liners, terrorist attacks on 
ferries could result in mass casualties which are likely to have acute political 
ramifications.  Furthermore, it could elicit strong domestic pressure for the initiation of 
mitigation measures extending far beyond the maritime realm.  Therefore, it would 
impact on the economy as the ship-owners would be exposed to large-scale 
compensation.  This is seen from the point of view of the liability paid when major 
ferry accidents have occurred, which although were not due to acts of piracy and 
terrorism.  For example, the 1994 sinking of Estonia in the Baltic Sea resulted in 852 
deaths and attracted victims’ claims of about USD 110 million.  Also, the 1987 
capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprise which resulted in 193 deaths attracted 
claims of about USD 70 million.  Undoubtedly, the liability payments would most likely 
have been much higher had terrorism figured as the cause of these incidents. 
 
3.6. Threats to Ports 
 
From the IMB Report, there is increase in the threats from acts of piracy and 
terrorism on about 6,500 ports and harbour facilities, as well as 45,000 shipping 
bureaus in the global maritime transport system.  Bateman (2007, p.248) observed 
that ports by their nature are vulnerable to criminal attacks.  Ports vary greatly with 
regards to their physical features such as geography, topography, surroundings and 
population.  Some ports are isolated and remotely located while others are located at 
the centre of a crowded city.  Also, separate facilities may not be large in a given port 
area while the geographical extent of a port may be very wide.  Therefore, to ensure 
port security involves ensuring the security of maritime environments which comprise 
of land, air, sea surface and subsurface.  Definitely, it would be difficult to achieve 
maritime security in all the environments and this would make the ports susceptible 
to piratical and terrorist attacks. 
 
In the busy areas of ports with access by land and sea, it could be practically 
impossible to secure the waterside physically.  This is in contrast to airports which 
 20
have well defined perimeters and usually some form of buffer zone between the 
airport and other activities.  As a result, access to an airport is more easily controlled 
than to a seaport.  In this regards, Banlaoi (2005, p.66) opined that terrorist groups 
regard seaports and commercial ships, in particular cruise liners as very attractive 
targets.  Similarly, experts have assessed that a more sinister scenario is the threat 
that a small but lethal biological weapon could be smuggled into a harbour onboard a 
ship and released into a crowded port.  Therefore, the incident of the terrorist attack 
on USS Cole at Aden Port in Yemen seems to suggest to an initial planning stage by 
the Al Qaeda in the exploitation of the vulnerability of ports to carry out acts of 
terrorism.      
 
Recently, the world-wide increase in acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, 
which is spearheaded by the unprecedented surge in piratical attacks in the Gulf of 
Aden off the coast of Somalia, has attracted the attention of the international 
community.  This is because the acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships 
seem to flourish despite the presence of international legal regimes to combat the 
crimes.  Subsequently, this paper will explore the international legislative framework 
designed to ensure maritime security.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES ON ENHANCING MARITIME SECURITY 
 
Over the years, the international legal regime has been developed and modified to 
adapt to prevailing unlawful acts which threaten maritime safety and security. 
According to Mukherjee (2002, p.55) the legal regimes set out the general principles 
and framework of the law which often represent a codification of prevalent 
international custom and practice.  This is in response to evolving threats to maritime 
security that the international community undertakes to amend existing legislation 
and where necessary enact new conventions.  Included in these public international 
law conventions are LOSC 1982, SUA 1988 Protocol and SOLAS 1974 As Amended.  
This cahpter will look at the rationale of the conventions in combating piracy, armed 
robbery against ships and terrorism. 
 
4.1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
 
In the past, piracy and armed robbery against ships were the major threats to the 
security of commercial shipping; the pirates attacking and forcefully gaining control of 
ships to rob the crew of their valuables and cargo.  Accordingly, coastal States took 
certain measures to protect ships and their crews from piratical attacks by persons 
operating from other ship.  Over time, these measures transformed into customs 
which were used to formulate customary international law.  The traditional law of 
piracy was codified in the 1958 first United Nations Conference on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS I) and the subsequent Conferences.8  The Conferences on the Law of 
the Sea resulted in the adoption of UNCLOS 1982 by the international community. 
 
According to UNCLOS (1982), acts of piracy are universal crimes and therefore 
punishable under the law of a State.  However, the UNCLOS defined the act of piracy 
in a narrow sense which makes it difficult for member States to have a common 
concept of the piracy act.  For example, one of the elements of piracy acts is that 
                                                 
8 It is contained in Articles 15 and 22 of the Convention on High Seas (UNCLOS I).  Subsequent 
Conferences are UNCLOS II in 1960 and UNCLOS III between 1973 and 1982.  
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they should be committed at high seas.  There is no particular State that has 
jurisdiction on these high seas.  However, the provision of “high seas” in the 
UNCLOS definition of piracy is hardly fulfilled in the new phenomenon of piracy 
whereby such acts occur mostly within the territorial waters of the coastal States.  
Banlaoi (2005, p.61) observed that piratical attacks occur mostly in ports and 
anchorages globally.  Also, a large number of piracy incidents occur in straits, choke 
points and archipelagic waters.  Among these are the Malacca and Singapore Straits 
and the surrounding waters of Malaysia and Indonesia archipelagic waters.  By the 
existing definition, these violent attacks are clearly not acts of piracy, since they 
occur within the territorial waters of the coastal States.  Therefore, the UNCLOS 
definition of piracy as an illegal act occurring on the high seas would need to be 
conceptualized to include incidents of armed robbery against ships and maritime 
terrorism within the territorial waters. 
 
Another difficulty encountered with UNCLOS is in the implementation of the “two 
ships” requirement in the act of piracy by member States.  In addition to the piracy 
acts being carried out on high seas, the pirates are required to board the target ship 
from another ship or aircraft.  However, there have been some incidents whereby the 
crew or passengers attack the ship illegally from within, such as the case of 
passenger ships Achille Lauro and Santa Maria.9  In January 1961, a Portuguese 
passenger liner Santa Maria was hijacked by a team of insurgents, led by Enrique 
Galvao, who disguised as passengers onboard the ship.  According to Menefee 
(1990, p.57), the Portuguese Authority reaction was to brand the Santa Maria’s 
insurgents as “pirates”, while requesting the assistance of recognised friendly 
governments of countries such as the USA and the United Kingdom (UK) among 
others in recovering the vessel.  Though the USA and the UK agreed to assist, there 
was no doubt that they had reservations on the labelling of the incident as an act of 
piracy.  This is evident from the instruction to the British Senior Naval Officer in the 
West Indies whereby he was instructed to arrest the Santa Maria without the use of 
force, through peaceful means.  
 
In the case of Achille Lauro, an Italian cruise liner, four armed Palestinians belonging 
to the PFLP boarded as passengers.  The ship with 400 passengers and crew was 
hijacked off the coast of Egypt and the hijackers demanded the release of 50 
                                                 
9 On 23 January, 1961, a party led by Captain Galvao seized the Santa Maria, while it was cruising in 
the Caribbean.  Galvao and his companions, who embarked as ordinary passengers, seized the ship in 
order to call the attention of world opinion to the dictatorship then ruling Portugal.  
 23
Palestinians prisoners held in Israel.  In demonstration of their seriousness, the 
hijackers killed one of the American tourists onboard and threw his body together 
with his wheel chair overboard. Again there is division among some countries on how 
to handle this phenomenon of violent and criminal acts onboard ships which is not 
covered by the provisions of UNCLOS.  The USA whose citizen was murdered, 
considered the incident as a piratical attack in which case the perpetrators should be 
brought to justice.  Egypt, as the port State, maintained that it was an act of 
insurgency and that insurgents could be negotiated with to resolve the issue 
peacefully.  Italy, whose flag the liner Achille Lauro was flying, was undecided on 
how to characterise the incident as a piratical attack.  After long tortuous negotiations, 
a settlement was reached by which the remaining hostages were freed and the 
hijackers allowed to flee.   
 
Obviously, these incidents against commercial shipping present more serious threats 
to global maritime security than the ones posed by the traditional pirates.  Unlike the 
provisions in UNCLOS, the attackers operated on the same ship where they were 
passengers and did not board the ship from another ship.  Also they acted without 
concern for their private gains, as they were seeking political and religious gains 
among others as well as calling the attention of the international community to 
address their grievances.  It is arguable that the existing legal regime is sufficient to 
tackle this evolving security threat since for the victims, the intentions of the attackers 
are irrelevant.  However, the events on the Santa Maria and Achille Lauro have 
shown that the traditional law of piracy could not effectively address the issues of 
maritime security in the present time.  In response to the incident onboard the Achille 
Lauro, the international community noted, with great concern, the danger to 
passengers and cargoes resulting from the increasing number of incidents involving 
piracy, armed robbery and other unlawful acts against or onboard ships, including 
small craft at anchor and underway.  Therefore in one of its resolutions, the IMO 
called for measures to prevent unlawful acts which threaten the safety of ships and 
the security of their passengers and crew.     
 
4.2. SUA Convention 1988 As Amended 
 
The international community has resolved that a new legal instrument, the SUA 
Convention 1988 and Protocol 2005, would be needed to supplement the existing 
regimes in dealing with the current trends on unlawful acts against commercial 
shipping.  While the SUA Convention 1988 was adopted on 10 March 1988 and 
 24
entered into force on 1 March 1992, the SUA Protocol 2005 was adopted on 14 
October 2005, with the provision that it would enter into force 90 days after the date 
on which 12 States formally ratify or accept it.  This is to be done through an official 
notification to the IMO secretary general of the States’ consent, to be bound by the 
Protocol’s provisions.  According to IMO Report (2009b) only 8 States have ratified 
the SUA Convention 2005 amendments as of 31 July 2009.          
 
In drafting the SUA Convention 1988, the models existing in the aviation industry 
were used.  Among these models were the Hague Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention), 1970 and the Montreal Convention 
for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation (Montreal 
Convention), 1971.  It is worth noting that the Hague Convention 1970 and Montreal 
Convention 1971 were the first UN terrorism conventions.  The SUA Convention 
states that it is an offence for any person to seize and exercise control over a ship by 
force, threat of force and any other form of intimidation.  Mensah (2004, p.2) 
observed that this position of the Convention is suggested in its preamble where it 
states to provide effective and practical measures for the prevention of all unlawful 
acts against the safety of maritime navigation as well as the prosecution and 
punishment of the perpetrators.          
 
According to Beckman (2009, p.189), the scheme of the SUA Convention 1988 has 
five features.  Among these are the definitions of some specific criminal offenses for 
states parties to criminalize under their domestic law punishable by serious 
penalties10 and establishment of jurisdiction over these criminal offenses within their 
territory11. Others are the obligation to “extradite or prosecute”12 offenders who are in 
custody of another state party accordingly13 and the Convention substituting as the 
legal basis for states parties to extradite alleged offenders to another state regardless 
of any existing extradition treaty.14  Also, it includes the obligations of states parties 
to afford one another the greatest measures of cooperation in connection with 
criminal proceedings to prosecute the offenders.15   
 
                                                 
10 Article 3 of the SUA Convention 1988 has the list of all the offenses 
11 Article 6 of the SUA Convention 1988. 
12 Article 7 of the SUA Convention 1988. 
13 Article 10 of the SUA Convention 1988. 
14 Article 11 of the SUA Convention 1988.  
15 Article 12 of the SUA Convention 1988. 
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Clearly, the SUA Convention was the real first attempt to broaden the provisions of 
piracy acts in the UNCLOS to include armed robbery against ships and acts of 
terrorism among others.  But some member States were slow in rectifying the 
Convention.  According to Beckman (2009, p.190), only 52 member States had 
ratified the Convention as at 31 December 2000.  However, after the event of 9/11 at 
the World Trade Centre, the USA changed this slow attitude and subsequently the 
number of member States who ratified the Convention increased to 142, which is 
significant.  Since being enforced, the Convention has been a very useful instrument 
in combating unlawful acts in commercial shipping.  It should be emphasized here 
that the usefulness of this Convention was not utilized in the incident of merchant 
vessel Petro Range in April 1999.   
 
The Petro Range was owned by a Singapore national, flying the flag of Malaysia and 
hijacked by Indonesians off the coast of Malaysia.  The hijacked ship was used for 
smuggling in China where the Indonesian “pirates” were arrested and charged 
accordingly.  They were convicted and served only a few months in jail as specified 
for the smuggling offenses.  Though China is a party to the Convention, Indonesia 
and Malaysia were not party States at time of the hijacking.  As a result, the two 
States could not demand from China the obligation to extradite or prosecute the 
alleged offenders in their custody as provided in the Convention.  However, in the 
case of the MV Alondra Rainbow, the ship was owned by a Japanese and was flying 
the flag of Panama.  The IMB reported the ship, having being hijacked in the Malacca 
Strait off the coast of Indonesia.  The Indian Navy interdicted and boarded the ship in 
the Indian Ocean within its EEZ to arrest the pirates.  This was purely on the 
provisions of the Convention, since there was no provision for this type of arrest in 
Indian domestic maritime law which was an offshoot from their colonial past.              
 
The SUA Convention 1988 gives enforcement power to coastal states to the extent 
that an offense under the Convention also constitutes a piracy act as defined in 
Article 101 of the UNCLOS, whereby any state could arrest and seize the pirates on 
the high seas, EEZ and territorial waters.  However, the SUA Convention (1988) 
dealt only with acts that threaten safety of maritime navigation.  Also, in the 
Convention’s definitions of criminal offenses, it falls short of terrorism, despite the fact 
that it was modelled along the lines of other terrorism conventions.  Furthermore, the 
Convention did not make additional provision for states to interdict, board ships and 
arrest offenders.  Therefore the effectiveness of this Convention in combating 
maritime crimes is limited.              
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The SUA Protocol 2005 is an improvement on the SUA Convention 1988 which was 
revised.  The provisions in the SUA Protocol are far reaching and three categories of 
new offenses were added to the list, while defining acts of terrorism in its annex 
containing the UN terrorism conventions, as follows: 
• The first category of new offenses concerns acts of maritime terrorism such as 
using a ship as a vector and means to carry out terrorist attacks. 
• The second category deals with non-proliferation offenses that are intended to 
strengthen the international legal basis to impede and prosecute the trafficking 
in commercial ships of WMD on the high seas. 
• Further, the third category establishes a new tool for dealing with persons who 
commit offenses under the other UN terrorism conventions.        
 
Undoubtedly, the provision for acts of terrorism in the SUA Protocol 2005 could 
sufficiently address the issue of the menace of terrorism in commercial shipping.  
However, the member States were reluctant to rectify the Protocol.  There are 
provisions in the SUA Protocol 2005 that member States and some international 
shipping organizations would need to agree on.  The new offenses listed in the 
Protocol require a specific “knowledge and intent” as well as “terrorist motive”, which 
must be to intimidate a population and compel a government to do or not doing an 
act.  The Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO, 2004) is among the 
international organizations that submitted comments on the draft SUA Protocol which 
led to modifications.   
 
Following these comments, it was suggested that the provisions of knowledge and 
intent in the final draft of the new offenses be incorporated to protect the interest of 
innocent seafarers and carriers.  Among other provisions provoking debate by 
member States are issues of proliferation in the scope of nuclear material offense, 
“dual-use” items in the transport offense.  The “saving clause” in the new offenses for 
States party to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was rejected by India and Pakistan 
among others.  Furthermore, though there was provision for interdiction and boarding 
of suspected ships in the SUA Protocol 2005, the “tacit authorization” provision for 
the boarding of ships at high seas was rejected by member States.  In this way, the 
Protocol retains the provision in the UNCLOS for the boarding of ships on the high 
seas, which is solely on the authority of the flag States.  However, recent events in 
Somalia are indication that the authority of a flag State does not exist where there is 
no functional Government.  Nevertheless, the effectiveness of the SUA      
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Convention 1988 and Protocol 2005 would depend upon all the member States 
becoming parties to it.   
 
4.3. SOLAS Convention 1974 As Amended 
    
From the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in the USA, in addition with the attacks on 
USS Cole and MT Limburg, some amendments in the provisions SOLAS Convention 
became necessary.  These amendments are for the effective detection and 
deterrence of acts of terrorism to enhance maritime security.  There is no doubt that 
the existing legal regimes such as UNCLOS, SUA Convention and Protocol among 
others could not adequately combat the menace of terrorism.  The use of the modes 
of transport by air, land and sea to conduct terrorists attacks have evolved globally.  
For example, the hijacked aircraft used for the 9/11 attacks fulfilled the safety 
conditions as prescribed in the existing international conventions and were actually 
safe to fly.  However, it has been demonstrated that there is a distinction between 
safety and security.  Therefore, the issue of acts of terrorism among other maritime 
crimes could not be effectively addressed with safety but rather through security 
measures.  Hence, the international community agreed that a new regulatory regime 
would be needed for combating this trend of acts of terrorism on commercial shipping. 
 
At its diplomatic conference in December 2002, the IMO adopted SOLAS 1974 As 
Amended to enhance the maritime security measures for ships and port facilities.  
The Convention as amended entered into force on 1 July 2004.  The amendments to 
the SOLAS 1974 consist essentially of the changes in the existing Chapters XI, which 
resulted to Chapter XI-1 and the addition of a new Chapter XI-2.  The renamed 
Chapter XI-1 deals with special measures to enhance maritime safety while Chapter 
XI-2 deals with special measures to enhance maritime security which in principle 
incorporates new regulations on definitions and the requirements for ships and port 
facilities.  These regulations are supported by the ISPS Code which has a mandatory 
section Part A and a recommendatory section Part B.     
 
The overall objective of the ISPS Code was to establish a form of international 
framework involving cooperation between all stakeholders in the maritime industry to 
detect and deter acts of terrorism which threaten maritime security.  The 
stakeholders include the Governments of member States, agencies, ship owners, 
shipping companies and port authorities among others.  However, like in the other 
existing conventions, member States could not agree to some proposals for 
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improving the security of ships in the new Code.  For example, some States 
expressed concerns about the proposals for the development of requirements on 
seafarer identification and background checks.  This was considered to be an issue 
that was more appropriate for the International Labour Organization (ILO) to handle.   
 
Another concern in the proposals was the extent to which the new Code could be 
applied to ports.  The reason was that the SOLAS Convention 1974 As Amended, 
which is a regulatory regime for the Code, had hitherto been applicable to ships only.  
Extending the Convention to regulate issues within ports might not go down well with 
some member States.  To deal with these concerns, it was decided, therefore, that 
the term “port facilities”, should be used in the final draft to relate solely to the 
ship/port interface.   According to Mensah (2004, p.7), although the ISPS Code was 
adopted within what is referred to as the “technical” aspects of the work of IMO, it 
plays a major role in the overall international regulatory regime for promoting and 
enhancing maritime security. However, effective implementation of this Code in 
conjunction with other international, regional and national regulations is pivotal for the 
prevention of all types of unlawful acts, including those directed against ships as well 
as those that would seek to use ships and persons among others. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
MARITIME SECURITY INSTRUMENTS 
 
This chapter evaluates the legal instruments used in ensuring maritime security 
globally since the incident of 9/11.  The instruments will include the ISPS Code 2002, 
USA maritime initiatives, Comité Maritime International (CMI) model national law and 
maritime security operations. 
 
5.1. International Ship and Port Facility Security Code  
 
The ISPS Code 2002 was formulated for international shipping by the IMO as a 
comprehensive regime to strengthen maritime security and specifically to prevent 
and suppress acts of terrorism against the maritime realm.  A number of measures 
were adopted in July 2004 in the SOLAS Convention 1974 As Amended, which 
aimed at enhancing maritime security onboard ships and at the ship-port interface.  
These amendments created a new SOLAS Chapter XI-2, which contains special 
measures to enhance maritime security.  Specifically, it deals with maritime security 
containing the mandatory requirement for member States’ ships and port facilities to 
comply with the ISPS Code.  The Code came into force on 1 July 2004.           
 
Fundamentally, the ISPS Code takes the approach that ensuring the security of ships 
and port facilities is basically a risk management activity.  Also, it demands that to   
determine what security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risks must 
be made in each particular case.  The purpose of the Code is to provide a 
standardized, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to 
offset changes in threat with changes in vulnerability, for ships and port facilities. 
 
Furthermore, in its preamble the ISPS Code states that the increase in maritime 
threats would only be counteracted logically with a reduction in vulnerability.  
Obviously, this seems to be the case in order to minimise the security risk level which 
is a combination of the threat and vulnerability associated with it.  The Code provides 
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several ways in which vulnerability could be reduced.  One of the ways is that the 
ship will be subjected to a system of survey, verification and control to ensure that 
the security measures are implemented.  This system of survey is based on a 
considerably expanded control system as stipulated in the SOLAS 1974 Convention 
As Amended.   
 
The SOLAS XI and the ISPS Code prescribe the measures to be taken in addressing 
the issues of maritime security in the light of the 9/11 incident.  These measures 
could be broadly divided into five major categories according to their focus.  They are 
measures targeting contracting governments, ships, shipping companies’ certification 
and ports.   
 
5.1.1. Measures Targeting Contracting Government 
 
To begin the process of security measures, each Contracting Government will 
conduct Port Facility Security Assessments (PFSAs) in its area of responsibility.  
These assessments have three essential components which include the identification 
and evaluation of important assets and infrastructures that are critical to the port 
facility as well as those areas or structures that, if damaged could cause significant 
loss of life and among others.  Also, the security assessment must identify the actual 
threats to focus on critical assets and infrastructures in order to prioritize security 
measures.  Furthermore, the assessment must address the vulnerability of the port 
facility by identifying its weaknesses in physical security, structural integrity, 
protection systems, procedural policies, communications systems, transportation 
infrastructure, utilities and other areas within a port facility that may be a likely target.  
These security assessments are essential for the Contracting Governments to 
accurately evaluate risk.           
 
The principal responsibilities of Contracting Governments under the IMO security 
regulations are to enforce the relevant provisions in SOLAS and the ISPS Code and 
make rules accordingly.  It is also the responsibility of the Contracting Government to 
designate an Authority for the implementation of the ISPS Code to determine and set 
the appropriate security levels 1, 2 and 3 which correspond to normal, heightened 
and exceptional threat situations respectively.  Other responsibilities of the 
Governments are as follows: 
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• Determination of which port facilities are required to designate a Port Facility 
Security Officer (PFSO). 
• Ensuring completion and approval of a PFSA and the Port Facility Security 
Plan (PFSP) for each port facility that serves ships engaged on international 
voyages. 
• Approving the Ship Security Plan (SSP) and amendments to previously 
approved plans.  
• Verifying the compliance of ships and issuing the International Ship Security 
Certificate (ISSC) and any subsequent amendments. 
• Exercising control and compliance measures in capacity as Port State. 
• Communicating information to the IMO, shipping companies and port industries.      
 
Considering the “Security Level 1 Normal”, it gives the minimum appropriate 
protective security measures which shall be maintained at all times onboard ships 
and port facilities.  These minimum measures shall ensure that all ship security 
duties are performed; access as well as the embarkation of persons and their effects 
controlled among others.  At “Security Level 2 Heighten”, the additional protective 
measures as specified in the SSP shall be implemented.  Also, at “Security Level 3 
Exceptional”, the further specific protective measures in the SSP shall be maintained.  
Practically, the implementation of these provisions in the Code is rarely carried out.  
Jones (2009, p.104) observed that some member States seem to be taking a relaxed 
view even in the wake of terrorist attacks.  The reason being deduced is that the 
higher security level would result in an increase in the provision of resources and 
change in the operating conditions onboard the ship.  However, this would raise one 
of the major issues of the security management system’s inability to increase security 
when a rise of level is imposed, thereby weakening the global security regime.               
 
5.1.2. Measures Targeting Ships 
 
Some ship-related provisions were modified in the SOLAS Convention 1974   
Chapter XI.  These include the acceleration of the implementation of the 
requirements to fit Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), marking of Ship’s 
Identification Number, installation of Ship’s Security Alert System and the       
carriage of a Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR) among others.  According to 
Murphy (2009, p.14), AIS could enhance maritime safety by providing all ship and 
shore stations with details of the position, course and speed of all the other AIS-
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equipped vessels within range.  In addition, it would facilitate more rapid and precise 
communication between stations in cases of emergency.  However, the AIS is an 
insecure means of communication, since the signal is broadcast and open to any 
appropriate receiver.  Furthermore, the low cost of AIS equipment and its wide 
availability constitutes a risk as pirates and terrorists could easily acquire the 
equipment for their nefarious use.  Additionally, the recent incident of piratical attack 
on Malta-flagged Russian cargo ship Artic Sea in the Baltic Sea in July 2009 has 
shown that pirates, once onboard, can render the AIS ineffective by switching off the 
responders.  
 
5.1.3. Measures Targeting Shipping Companies  
 
The IMO rules outlined some steps required for the issuance of a ISSC.  Therefore, it 
is the principal responsibility for ship-owners and shipping companies to ensure that 
their ships obtain ISSC.  The ISSC is to be issued by the Administration or by a 
Recognized Security Organization (RSO), such as a classification society, on behalf 
of the Flag State.  These are designating a Company Security Officer (CSO), Ship 
Security Officer (SSO), undertaking a Ship Security Assessment (SSA) and 
developing a Flag-State approved SSP which incorporates all of the elements 
included in part “A” of the ISPS Code.  Also, it includes providing adequate training 
for the CSO, SSO and the Crew, ensuring adequate drills and exercises are carried 
out, proper equipment of the ships for security matters as outlined in the SSP and 
adequate keeping of security-related records outlined in part “A” of the ISPS Code. 
 
It is noteworthy that the SSP could be one of the best allies of ships and their crew.  
However, it could be a snare for the shipping company, far more damaging than the 
act of piracy and terrorism.  It has been said that the key to maritime security is 
making the SSP work through the development of a security system that is capable 
of working.  Jones (2009, p.96) states that there are some SSPs which are 
unfortunately not fit for the purpose of ensuring security.  Therefore, there is a need 
for the CSO, SSO, master and Flag State to work together in ensuring that the ship 
would comply and realistically respond to any eventuality of criminal attacks.   
However, the Port State having clear grounds to believe that the ship is not in 
compliance with the requirements of the ISPS Code can review the relevant 
requirements of the SSP with the consent of the master or Flag State.  It is well 
understood that security threats are based on maritime domain intelligence, which is 
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changing continuously.  The implication of this is that the SSP would need to be a 
living document which is maintained and updated regularly.     
 
5.1.4. Measures Targeting Ports 
 
The ISPS Code sets out broadly analogous requirements for ports as it does for 
ships.  Port facilities that are involved in international shipping are required to carry 
out an approved PFSA, develop PFSP and designate a PFSO with skills and training 
similar to the CSO.  Other requirements for the port facilities are to ensure that the 
PFSO and other personnel receive adequate training and that the port facilities are 
sufficiently equipped as well as manned to operate under the three levels of security 
alert.   
 
It is observed that the Code deals with issues concerning port facilities and not ports.  
A port facility is conceptualized as the ship-port interface, which is the point of 
interaction between the ship and the port.  It is at this point that the ship comes in 
contact with the land, including private berthing quays and independent terminals 
among others.  The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD, 2003, p.39)16 posited that the list of port facilities globally are innumerable 
and vary significantly when compared with that of the port.  This implies that security 
assessment of the ports would not adequately cover port facilities which outnumber it 
by far.     
 
5.2. Drawbacks of the ISPS Code 
 
Despite the overwhelming enthusiasm with which the international community 
accepted the ISPS Code in 2004 when it came into force with over 90 per cent of 
States party to it, the maritime crimes continued to rise (IMB, 2009).  Acts of piracy 
and armed robbery against ships have increased tremendously globally, largely due 
to the high rate of pirate attacks in the Gulf of Aden, off the coast of Somalia and 
along the Horn of Africa region.  Although the Code is primarily a measure for 
counter-terrorism onboard ships and port facilities; it can also be an effective 
measure for counter-piracy and armed robbery against ships among others, which 
presently portend maritime insecurity.  However, the ISPS Code seems to have its 
limitation in ensuring maritime security. 
                                                 
16 The OECD comprised of 30 developed countries and was formed in 1961 as a forum for discussion 
of social, economic and development matters globally.  
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Similar to the other international legal regimes existing before it, the ISPS Code has 
some grey areas from the onset.  The Code deals with security issues relating to only 
shipping which include passenger ships, cargo ships of above 500 gross tonnage 
and high speed craft.  However, it excluded some ships of less tonnage which 
constitute a serious threat to maritime security.  It may be recalled that the terrorist 
attacks on MT Limburg and USS Cole were carried out using a boat as a vector in 
each case.  Other drawbacks of the Code include its restriction to deal with mobile 
offshore drilling units (MODUs) and port facilities serving ships engaged in 
international voyages.  There are several offshore and port facilities which are 
excluded by this restriction, but are prone to maritime terrorist activities.  This is one 
of the drawbacks in the provisions of the ISPS Code.    
 
Another drawback is that the Code provides a framework of requirements without 
stipulating specific standards for satisfying those requirements.  For example, the 
Code has provisions for ships and port facilities to have security plans, security 
officers and certain security equipment; but the Code leaves it up to individual 
Contracting Governments to provide specific details.  As a result, there is not a set of 
minimum standards for the measures to be taken in ensuring maritime security from 
acts of terrorism, piracy and illegal activities.  The standards vary from one country to 
another depending on how each country perceives its own maritime security risk.  
Therefore, there are no established minimum standards for training to become a 
“qualified” security officer, access and perimeter control, electronic surveillance, 
guards and communication among others. What these drawbacks have done is to 
underline the fact that the ISPS Code needs the maximum support from the national 
law to be effective in combating terrorism and other maritime crimes. In fact it is 
arguable, as the USA has demonstrated that the ISPS Code is a small but vital part 
of a larger logistic chain in international trade.  
 
5.3. The United States Maritime Security Initiatives 
 
In the aftermath of 9/11, the USA Coast Guard (USCG) was placed under the newly 
created Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which consequently, developed 
policies that cover an extensive range of activities in the maritime transport system.  
According to Pallis et al (2008, p.236), these policies focus on ships, containers and 
port facilities among others. Initially, it was seen that the USA adopted measures 
largely supplementary to the ISPS Code and the emphasis was as far as possible on 
the most extended application of the Code.  Included in the new mandatory maritime 
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security initiatives are the Maritime Transport Security Act 2002 (MTSA, 2002) and 
the 24-hour Advance Manifest Rule.  Other voluntary security programmes include 
Container Security Initiative (CSI) and the Custom-Trade Partnership Against 
Terrorism (C-TPAT).             
 
The MTSA authorized the development and implementation of port security and 
vessel tracking measures.  It is in response to this that the IMO proposed the Long 
Range Identification and Tracking (LRIT) which was adopted in May 2006 as an 
amendment to the SOLAS Convention.  Looking at the USA maritime security 
initiatives, they are similar to the international legal regimes.  They are not a stand-
alone system of initiatives, but they work in tandem and supplement one another.  In 
fact, the MTSA is seen as the USA version of the ISPS Code.  In addition, the CSI 
and C-TPAT are a further extension of the Code in the international trade supply 
chain as shown at Figure 2.      
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Figure 2 - Scope of IMO and USA Security Initiatives in Container Logistics Chain 
Source:  OECD (2003).  Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact. 
Maritime Transport Committee 
 
5.4. Comité Maritime International Model National Law 
 
The CMI (2008) is an international Non-governmental Organization (NGO) which 
assists in modelling international maritime law to ensure uniform application in 
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national law.  As mentioned earlier, the international community seems to have 
experienced difficulty in uniformly interpreting acts of piracy and other maritime 
crimes in terms of jurisdiction of the act, person and place.  The traditional definition 
of the act of piracy by UNCLOS could not ensure uniform understanding of the act in 
member States; the definition is inadequate in addressing all issues of current 
incidents of piracy and armed robbery against ships. 
 
For example, the provisions of the high seas and two ships requirements in the act of 
piracy could not help on this issue.  Most of the acts of piracy and armed robbery 
against ships are carried out within territorial waters and EEZ about 200 miles from 
the coastline.  Furthermore, in the implementation of the SUA Convention and ISPS 
Code subsequently, references are made to the definitions of acts of piracy and other 
maritime crimes among others in the provisions in UNCLOS, despite their 
inadequacy.  As result the traditional jurisdiction of the flag States in boarding ships 
and arresting suspects in international shipping is maintained, regardless whether a 
flag State is capable and willing to carry out this responsibility.  However, the CMI 
Model Law tries to define the act of piracy and other maritime crimes to cover all 
issues raised by member States and to ensure that the content of the admiralty law is 
adequately reflected in the national law.  The Model Law is a private international law 
from the CMI, which is a NGO and therefore it is not binding on member States.     
 
5.5. Maritime Security Operations 
 
Inevitably, the inadequacy of the international regulatory regimes has resulted in 
naval counter-terrorism and piracy campaigns.  Over the years, the navies and coast 
guards of the nations have carried out operations to secure SLOCs as well as ensure 
maritime security in international and territorial waters.  For instance, during the Cold 
War era, warships from the USA-led-Western Bloc and Russian-led-Eastern Bloc 
were frequently patrolling the seas respectively.  This resulted in reducing the acts of 
piracy and other maritime crimes to a minimum level. 
 
However, at the end of the Cold war in the late 1980s, many nations withdraw the 
presence of their navies from international waters as one of the dividends of the new 
world order in peacetime and to reduce the cost of naval operations.  This 
development seems to have ushered in an increase in acts of terrorism and piracy, 
which were hitherto controlled adequately.  Recently, the increase in acts of piracy 
and armed robbery against ships as reported by IMB has provided a new challenge 
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to the navies of the world.  Furthermore, the incident of 9/11 has witnessed the 
formation of USA-led Naval Coalition Forces, as a Maritime Component Force, in the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).   
 
This is asymmetric warfare whereby the navies are more involved in constabulary 
work.  Some of the naval operations being conducted in the ongoing GWOT include 
the USA-led Operation Active Endeavour (OAE) in the Mediterranean Sea and Multi-
national Combined Task Force (CTF) in the Gulfs of Hormuz and Aden as well as the 
European Union-led (EU) Operation Atalanta off the Horn of Africa.  Undoubtedly, the 
navies of the world would remain one of the vital instruments for enhancing maritime 
security globally, but this could be hindered by the provisions in the Constitutions of 
some member States which prohibit the use of military power for law enforcement 
missions.   
 
In discussing the requirements for the effective implementation of the ISPS Code 
globally, some of the USA maritime security initiatives and the use of maritime 
component Forces on enhancement of maritime security were also looked into.  As 
has always been the case, most international legislation is regulatory in nature and 
therefore requires supporting domestic law for enforcement.  Admittedly the USA is a 
leading member of the developed nations and the country could easily overcome the 
burden imposed by the requirements of the Code.  Despite all these efforts from 
international and national legislation, acts of piracy continue unabated globally as 
shown in the chart at Appendix B on trends in acts of piracy.  The navies of the world 
and other law enforcement agencies are involved in combating piracy and maritime 
terrorism in the Gulf of Aden, off the coasts of Yemen and Somalia as well as along 
the Horn of Africa.  Yet piracy attacks are increasing in this region as well as the Gulf 
of Guinea according to the IMB Report of 2009.  It seems there is some constraints 
to the effectiveness of the ISPS Code and other legal regimes in these regions as will 
be discussed subsequently.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
CONSTRAINTS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ISPS CODE IN NIGERIA 
 
Since January 2004, there have been some international events which have focused 
on various aspects of maritime security in Africa and the Gulf of Guinea.  
Undoubtedly, the acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships off the coast of 
Somalia and along the Horn of Africa are on top the List of IMB’s Reports.  Previously, 
the top position used to be taken by the Southeast Asian countries along the Malacca 
Strait.  Also, the Gulf of Guinea was ranked as one of the most troubled waterways, 
while occupying the second position as shown in the chart at Appendix C.   
 
The Gulf of Guinea comprises of eleven coastal countries along the West and 
Central African countries, with a total coastline of about 5500 kilometres.  These 
countries include Angola, Benin, Congo, Ghana and Nigeria among others.  Recent 
increase in acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships as indicated in Table 3, 
and the deplorable state of maritime security in some of these countries has become 
a major concern to the international community.  Some researchers have estimated 
that the Gulf of Guinea region would attract an investment of over USD10 billion in 
the petroleum sector from 2005 to 2015 (Gilpin, 2007).  This will include an 
investment in the region whereby the USA will imports about 20 per cent of the 
petroleum oil from the region.17  Additionally, with the new discovery of oil off the 
coast of Ghana, the per cent of oil from the region would increase significantly.  
However, this increase would depend on how the countries of this region, particularly 
Nigeria would overcome the constraints in implementing the international legal 
regimes in its’ geographical area of responsibility, to ensure maritime security. 
                                                 
17 Currently, USA imports about 17 per cent of oil from the West and Central African countries and it 
accounts to 80 per cent of USA total investment in the African continent. 
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Table 3 - Hotspot Areas in the Gulf of Guinea for Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery 
Against Ships 
Number of Actual and Attempted Attacks Annually  
 
Ser 
Gulf of 
Guinea 
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) 
1. Angola 1 3 1 - 3 - - 4 1 2 
2. Cameroon 3 2 7 5 2 4 2 1 - 2 
3. Ghana 2 2 5 5 3 5 3 3 1 7 
4. Guinea 6 6 3 2 4 5 1 4 2 0 
5. Ivory Coast 5 5 9 5 2 4 3 1 - 3 
6. Nigeria 12 9 19 14 39 28 16 12 42 40 
7. Senegal 1 - 1 3 8 5 - - - - 
Source:  IMB Yearly Reports from January 1999 to January 2009.   
 
Though many of these countries are signatories to most relevant international 
conventions on maritime security, very few have taken concrete measures to ratify 
and domesticate these conventions.  For example, in Nigeria none of the 
international regulatory legislation has been supported with national enforcing 
legislation.  Studies have shown that the international instruments for enhancing 
maritime security such as SOLAS 1974 As Amended, SUA Convention 2005 and 
ISPS Code are invoked by the Administration in Nigeria in-situ without their 
domestication.  This is in contrary to the IMO recommendation that member States 
nationalize existing international legislation.  As a result, the provisions in the legal 
instruments for ensuring maritime security are difficult to implement in the Gulf of 
Guinea region.  In carrying out this Study, there are many constraints which have 
been identified to hinder effective implementation of the maritime rules and 
regulations in Nigeria.  These constraints include high cost of implementing the ISPS 
Code, high level of corruption in Government and poor governance, lack of resources, 
insufficient security personnel, inadequate personnel training, substandard flag of 
convenience and high sensitivity of territorial water sovereignty.  Others are 
insufficient maritime domain awareness, lack of regional cooperation and poor 
equipment of the Naval Force. 
 
6.1. High Cost 
 
The ISPS Code imposes significant additional costs on the Contracting Governments 
and ship-owners to implement, which includes the purchase of equipment and having 
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to employ more personnel as security officers.18  According to the OECD Report 
(2003, p.2), the initial burden on all ship operators worldwide is estimated to be at 
least USD1,279 million and USD 730 million per year thereafter, for additional 
manpower and security-related equipment.         
 
The countries of the Gulf of Guinea are among the developing countries of the world.  
Some of the countries do not have the financial capability to spend a large amount of 
money on the security of merchant shipping annually.  Consequently, the effort of 
Nigeria to implement the provisions of the ISPS Code in her geographical area of 
responsibility is being hindered by the high cost of compliance.  
 
6.2. High Level of Corruption in the Governments                                
 
According to the reports of the Transparency International (2008), there is high level 
of corruption of officials of the Governments in the Gulf of Guinea.  Nigeria is among 
the countries in the region that are worse affected in corrupt practices according to 
the report.  Definitely, it would be difficult to ensure effective implementation of 
maritime security regimes in a corrupt environment.  However, the issue of corruption 
is being addressed in the Gulf of Guinea countries.  For example, the Independent 
Corrupt Practice and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic 
and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) have been established in Nigeria for the 
purpose of eradicating corruption. 
 
A direct consequence of corruption is the poor governance in the West and Central 
African countries.  As a result of this, some of countries have tended towards fail 
States status, which is a trademark for a lawless society and haven for criminal 
activities.  For example, petroleum and gas resources have been discovered in large 
quantity off-shore in the Gulf of Guinea and Nigeria ranks the sixth largest exporter of 
crude oil in the world (Rilwanu, 2009).  Most of the facilities for the oil production are 
off-shore and the countries in this region lack sufficient maritime security operatives, 
which has significantly facilitated illegal bunkering.  As a result, the money realized 
from the illegal bunkering and other maritime crimes is being used by militant groups 
in Niger-Delta such as MEND and Niger Delta Peoples Salvation Front (NDPSF) to 
finance terrorism as well as piracy and armed robbery against ships. 
 
                                                 
18 Katrin Berkenkopf also reflected this view as that of a German tramp owner in the Lloyd’s List 
online, 28 October 2004.  
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6.3. Lack of Resources 
 
According to IMO Reports (2008), the countries of Gulf of the Guinea are yet to fully 
comply with the standards for port safety and security provisions in ISPS Code and 
the other regimes due to lack of resources.  For example, there are some resources 
needed in the ports for the effective implementation of the ISPS Code.  These 
include ships, security personnel, vessel traffic services (VTS) centre, AIS, LRIT and 
other surveillance equipment.  In some countries in the Gulf of Guinea, the existing 
infrastructure is weak while in others the infrastructure is lacking.  As a result, the 
implementation of the existing international legal regimes in this sub-region is 
hindered.  However, in these countries such as Angola, Ghana and Nigeria where 
the infrastructure is weak, efforts are being made to repair, upgrade and replace 
them appropriately.   
 
6.4. Inadequate Training of Personnel 
 
Adequate training of personnel is essential for effective and efficient maritime 
security planning as well as operation.  However, the training of personnel in 
maritime security is inadequate in the countries of the Gulf of Guinea.  The 
Governments of these countries do not have the political will and financial resources 
for the training of personnel in the security of international shipping.  It results from 
the fact that the ISPS Code does not specify the minimum standard of training that 
would be required for the security operators.  In this analysis, the personnel training 
not only includes the security officers, but also the crew members, as experience has 
shown that it is often crew members of a fairly low rank and limited training that will 
attempt to implement the Code (Raymond,  2005, p.200).  
 
6.5. Substandard Flags of Convenience 
 
Some of the ships involved in the breach of maritime security are registered in 
developing countries globally and this includes countries in the Gulf of Guinea.  
Recently, the situation is that a ship-owner residing in Europe could fly the flag of 
convenience of Liberia in West Africa, resulting from an inability of the ship to fulfil 
the stringent requirements in the provisions of the ISPS Code in Europe and other 
developed nations.  However, this has made the countries of West Africa register and 
own substandard ships.  It is on record that about 85 per cent of the vessels 
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registered in the Gulf of Guinea countries are above 20 years, making them 
susceptible to accidents and insecurity.         
 
6.6. High Sensitivity of Territorial Water Sovereignty 
 
Enduring disputes over maritime boundaries could impair maritime security globally.  
This has been the case with some countries in the Gulf of Guinea.  It was observed 
that as a result of the disputes, some countries in the sub-region have difficulties to 
address shared security concerns in a collaborative manner.  Among the major 
maritime disputes in the Gulf of Guinea are those between Cameroon and Nigeria 
over the Bakassi Peninsular as well as between Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea 
over an island at the mouth of the Ntem River.  Another dispute is also between 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon over the Mbane Island and Corisco Bay boundaries.  
Murphy (2007, p.166) have observed that pirates have shown no propensity to 
respect national boundaries that are disputed, as is the case with the countries in the 
Gulf of Guinea. 
 
Furthermore, one of the consequences of the boundary disputes is the lack of 
cooperation among neighbouring coastal States in the region which tends to hinder 
effective maritime security.  For example, some countries would find it difficult to 
address shared security concerns in partnership with the other countries in the region. 
This tends to impair the effectiveness of the international legislation in this region.   
 
6.7. Insufficient Maritime Domain Awareness 
 
The need for “maritime domain awareness” (MDA) has been a central focus in the 
GWOT.  The MDA provides early knowledge of what is happening in the maritime 
environment, including details of cargoes and people heading inward towards to 
ports.   This is very useful in the conduct of naval operations as well as in the 
provision of maritime and port security.  However, there is evidence that criminal 
organizations are resorting to deception to circumvent the usefulness of the MDA 
approach to maritime security.  In this case, it is essential that the MDA combines 
with intelligence gathering from military intelligence, national intelligence and other 
recognized intelligence agencies.   
 
Undoubtedly, there is insufficient awareness in the maritime domain of the Gulf of 
Guinea countries.  Some of the old ships in this region are SOLAS Convention non-
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compliance and therefore could not supply sufficient information regarding their 
identification.  Also, the military and national intelligence of these countries have 
insufficient data concerning the security information of the old ships as well as from 
deceptions by criminal ships in the Gulf of Guinea.       
 
6.8. Poorly Equipped Naval Force 
 
Modern naval forces in definitional terms should be able to upgrade equipment and 
existing platforms as well as introduce new platforms into the inventory.  This also 
includes the adoption of new operational concepts for navies to aid civil authorities in 
peacetime and in conducting war.  A well-equipped naval force is a vital component 
in the operational plan for the enforcement of maritime security in some geographical 
areas such as the Gulf of Guinea. 
 
Nigeria has the largest navy with an air arm as well as an Order of Battle (ORBAT) 
covering large percentage of the entire sub-region.  Although the Nigerian Navy (NN) 
and the other navies in the region are employed for Coast Guard duties by the 
National Law, however, these navies are poorly equipped.  As a result of this, there 
has been insufficient patrolling of the territorial waters by the coastal States in 
performing of the port States control duties (Gilpin, 2007).  The Gulf of Guinea is 
experiencing shortage of basic functioning surveillance systems, material and trained 
personnel for the navies, coast guards and other law enforcement agencies.  
Obviously, poorly equipped navies and enforcement agencies have made the 
implementation of maritime security regimes ineffective in the region.  Having looked 
at the constraints in the implementation of the ISPS Code and the other legal 
regimes in the Gulf of Guinea and particularly in Nigeria, the subsequent section 
would consider strategic measures being taken for effective implementation of the 
Code to enhance maritime security. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE MARITIME SECURITY IN THE GULF OF GUINEA 
 
An effective ISPS Code is a requirement in ensuring maritime security globally.  In 
the Gulf of Guinea, neighbouring coastal countries should take measures to ensure 
that the provisions in the Code are effectively carried out.  As was discussed earlier, 
some of the provisions in the ISPS Code do not specify the standards of the 
requirements for its implementation.  Instead, they are being left to individual 
Contracting Governments to determine and apply accordingly.  For example, 
although the Code and other legal regimes criminalize the acts of terrorism and 
piracy, the legislation did not specify standard courts of jurisdiction or punishments to 
be awarded to the perpetrators.    
 
Another example is the provision in the Code specifying the need for security officers 
to be onboard ships and port facilities.  Again the Code does not specify the standard 
qualifications and training for security officers.  However, it specifies that security 
officers should receive training through seminars, drills and exercises.  Nevertheless, 
it was left on individual shipping companies to decide the extent and standard of the 
training for ships’ security officer.  Currently, the incident of pirate attacks on USA-
flagged MV Maersk Alabama on April 2009 underlined the importance of strategic 
training in security issues for ship crew.  It is worth noting that after the pirates had 
attacked and boarded the ship on the high seas in the Indian Ocean, the efforts of 
the crew-members of the Maersk Alabama that helped to retake control of the ship in 
the Horn of Africa waters.   
 
All the requirements in the ISPS Code that are not specified were left for the 
Contracting Countries to work out in detail and implement accordingly.  Early on, the 
degree of each State concerned with matters of terrorism and piracy have varied 
from one State to another.  In fact some, like the countries in the Gulf of Guinea, do 
not make terrorism and piracy a priority as a threat to maritime security.   In fact, in 
Nigeria, there is no National Law against acts of terrorism and piracy.  However, the 
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perpetrators of these criminal acts could be tried with other Penal Code of the 
National Laws bordering on murder, armed robbery and possession of illegal firearms 
among others. Faced with the difficulties in enforcing the ISPS Code in Nigeria, some 
strategies have been identified which may make the Code effective within the region.  
However, in the absent of corruption, these strategies include the domestication of 
international legislation, maritime security tax collection, a maritime domain 
awareness initiative and a regional maritime security initiative.  Others are ships-port 
facilities security initiatives, manpower training developments, the use of armed 
escorts onboard ships and the deployment of a rapid reaction Naval Force.   
 
7.1. Domestication of International Legislation  
 
Most of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea are party signatory to the international 
legislation such as UNCLOS, SUA Convention and ISPS Code.  The ISPS Code is a 
vital instrument for ensuring the security of ships and port facilities from acts of 
terrorism, piracy and other maritime crimes.  Despite their importance to maritime 
security, certain provisions in these international legal regimes have not been 
domesticated in the National Laws of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea.  This 
implies that the Criminal Code of these countries could not treat acts of terrorism and 
piracy as criminal offences in itself.   
 
For example in Nigeria, acts of terrorism and piracy are not defined by the Laws of 
the Federation of Nigeria (LFN); therefore these acts could not be prosecuted in any 
of the law courts in Nigeria.  However, LFN declares it a criminal offence for murder, 
arson, illegal possession of firearms and explosives which are punishable by the law 
courts in Nigeria.  This implies that terrorists and pirates could be prosecuted by 
these complementary acts to their criminal offences.  With the increase in acts of 
terrorism and piracy in this region, with Nigerian waters having the second highest 
number of attacks in 2008, second only to Somalia waters (IMB, 2009); there is a 
need for the codification of these offences in the National Laws.  This strategy will 
directly treat acts of terrorism and piracy as criminal offences; thereby ensure 
effective implementation of ISPS Code in the Gulf of Guinea.      
 
7.2. Provision for Special Maritime Security Tax 
 
The Governments of coastal countries have proposed a special tax on International 
shipping to ensure maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.  As earlier stated the 
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OECD (2003) has estimated the combined capital cost of implementing the ISPS 
Code by ship operators is about US$1,279 million, while the combined running cost 
is about $730 million annually.  These amounts are by far more than the annual 
budgetary expenditure of some of the countries in the Gulf of Guinea.  For example, 
the Togo and Benin total budget expenditures for the year 2008 are about $554 
million and $1,226 million respectively (CIA, 2008).   This implies that some of the 
countries do not have the funds to off-set the financial burden for fulfilling the 
requirements of effective ISPS Code implementation in the region. 
 
However, it is worthwhile that the countries in the Gulf of Guinea raise the required 
funds through special maritime security tax arrangements from shipping activities.  
From experience, the cost benefit of taking measures in the form of having effective 
ISPS Code implementation, by far outweighs the one of not taking adequate 
measures which would result in ineffective ISPS Code.  According to Rilwanu (2009), 
Nigeria, the sixth largest oil producer in the world, presently loses about 1.0 million oil 
barrels per day (mbpd) from her estimated target of 2.2 mbpd due to terrorist attacks 
from militant groups in the Niger Delta.  Since about 95 per cent of the country’s 
revenue is from crude oil exportation, it follows that the Nigerian annual income has 
been halved as a result of the insecurity in her territorial waters in the region.  
Therefore, the proposed special tax on shipping activities for maritime security in the 
Gulf of Guinea is a strategic measure to ensure the availability of funding for effective 
ISPS Code implementation.  
 
7.3. Maritime Domain Awareness Initiative 
 
The USA is introducing the MDA Initiative in the Gulf of Guinea through bilateral and 
multilateral agreements.  As mentioned earlier, the Gulf of Guinea is one of the 
regions in the world where shipping activities are mostly ungovernable and 
unregulated.  This has been attributed to insufficient MDA in the region, which is 
making the area prone to maritime crimes.  However, with American strategic interest 
in the oil from this region, coastal States in the Gulf of Guinea are being engaged in 
the MDA programmes organized by the USA Navy and USCG.   
 
For example, the USA Navy is in partnership with Nigeria Navy (NN) in establishing 
Regional Maritime Awareness capability (RMAC) centre in Nigeria.  This RMAC 
centre has LRIT systems covering over 45 nm area of the sea, within the range of 
which all shipping activities in the Nigerian Waters could be monitored and controlled 
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to enhance maritime security.  For this strategy to succeed, there is a need for 
appropriate sharing of information between the NN and law enforcement agencies on 
illegal shipping activities in the MDA.  
 
7.4. Regional Maritime Cooperation 
 
Given the trans-national character of maritime security threats, there is a need for the 
establishment of regional maritime cooperation agreements to check the menace of 
the acts terrorism and piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.  Though, the USA in the 
aftermath of 9/11 introduced a series of unilateral security measures to combat 
maritime terrorism within its geographical area of responsibility, these were ad-hoc 
measures in ensuring maritime security.  However, these measures are more 
stringent than the ones provided by the existing maritime regulations.  The 
international community in adopting some of these security initiatives has stated that 
the best result is achieved when the measures are taken through bilateral, 
multilateral and regional cooperation.        
 
In the Gulf of Guinea, the littoral States high sensitivity of territorial waters 
sovereignty will have to be de-emphasized for the sake of more effective regional 
cooperation in combating maritime security threats.  For example, in the current 
protocol, it would be difficult for a naval ship, being the only asset available on-scene, 
to continue its hot pursuit of a pirate or suspected terrorist, once the suspect enters 
another State’s territorial waters.  Furthermore, the Gulf of Guinea has multiple 
bordering countries and joining sovereign littoral States, therefore there is the need 
for regional cooperation among these countries on ensuring maritime security within 
the region. 
 
Hence, the countries in the Gulf of Guinea have established regional organizations 
such as the maritime Organization for West and Central African States (MOWCA) 
and the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC), to promote regional cooperation among 
the countries. Additionally, there is an on-going bilateral agreement between 
Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria in the sharing of their maritime assets to ensure 
security in the Gulf of Guinea.  Definitely, the strategy of regional cooperation would 
enhance maritime security and impact on effective ISPS Code implementation and 
other security instruments within the region.  
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7.5. Ship-Port Facilities Security Initiatives 
 
The increasing acts of terrorism as well as piracy and armed robbery against ships 
have necessitated the stakeholders in the shipping industry to adopt some strategies 
in securing ships and port facilities.  Among these strategies are perimeter fencing, 
the provision of closed circuit television (CCTV) and armed guards onboard.  In 
perimeter fencing, the situation at seaports is quite different from that in airports.  An 
airport is surrounded by land and can easily be fenced-in for security purposes. 
 
On the other hand, a seaport is surrounded by land and water; the land side of the 
port can easily be fenced-in while it is practically impossible to fence-in the waterside 
of the port.  Also, in the use of wire fenced ships to deter unlawful boarding of the 
ship, these fences should not obstruct safety escape passages onboard.  CCTV no 
doubt would increase the surveillance capability of the security zone in the vicinity.  
However, when borne on ships, adequate care has to be taken to ensure that it does 
not interfere with the ship’s navigation system or cause distraction to the watch 
keepers onboard. 
 
7.6. Weapons Control onboard Ships 
 
In some countries with restrictive gun laws such as Indonesia and Malaysia in 
Southeast Asia, firearms and armed guards are permitted onboard merchant ships 
and ports in the Straits of Malacca.  It is worth noting that this is a limited strategic 
approach in ensuring security of ships and port facilities.  In the Gulf of Guinea, the 
countries prohibit the carriage and use of firearms for security of shipping activities 
unconditionally.  Therefore, it is unlikely that these countries would allow ships with 
unlawful possession of firearms into their ports.  Furthermore, the IMO and the EU 
strictly discourage the use of firearms onboard merchant vessels on the premise that 
it could escalate armed conflict with the pirates and terrorists.   
              
7.7. Manpower Development Training 
 
Personnel recruitment, retention, development and training are vital for the 
successful implementation of the provisions in the ISPS Code on enhancing maritime 
security.  As mentioned above, the ISPS Code does not specify a uniform standard 
of training for security personnel.  This is being left for individual countries to decide 
upon the level of training based on their own risk evaluation.  Recently, the Gulf of 
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Guinea is reported to be a very high risk zone in international shipping (IMB, 2009).  
The region is ranking second to the Gulf of Aden off Somalia and along the Horn of 
Africa, having displaced the Strait of Malacca in Southeast Asia to the third place on 
the list.  In the light of this development, there is a need for capacity building in the 
recruiting, retaining and training of security personnel in the Gulf of Guinea.   
 
Countries in the Gulf of Guinea have entered into bilateral and multilateral 
agreements with the USA, EU and the international community on ways developing 
capacity building for the security personnel in the region.  The capacity building 
would involve recruitment, training and retention of the ship security personnel in 
accordance with the provisions in the ISPS Code.  As a result of the agreements, 
several workshops such as “train the trainers” workshops on maritime security are 
being conducted in Gabon, Ghana and Nigeria.  Furthermore, the USCG and the US 
Naval Forces in Europe have been instrumental in the capacity building by 
conducting regular sea training exercises for the security personnel in this region.  
Therefore, the strategy of manpower training would enhance the skill and expertise of 
security operators in the region, thereby ensuring effective implementation of the 
ISPS Code and other regimes.      
 
7.8. Deployment of Naval Task Forces  
 
High-risk waters around the world would necessitate the use of naval forces in the 
support of civil authorities to ensure maritime security.  This has been the situation 
with the GWOT in “hotspot areas” such as the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Hormuz, Gulf of 
Persia, Mediterranean Sea and Strait of Malacca.  Presently, there are multinational 
coalition forces with the mandate of the UN and led by the US Navy in “Operation 
Active Endeavour” and regional forces led by EU in “Operation Atalanta” which are to 
enhance the maritime security in the “hot spot” areas worldwide.  However, it is worth 
noting that these formidable Naval Forces were primarily deployed as a counter-
terrorism measure in GWOT, but the counter-piracy measure has been included 
secondarily due to the worsened situation in the Gulf of Aden off the coast of Somali.  
This seems to have secured SLOCs in the region from piratical attacks on 
international shipping. 
 
However, the situation in the Gulf of Guinea does not warrant similar multinational 
naval force for patrolling the waters in the region.  Nevertheless, the presence of 
regional navies is needed to detect and deter maritime crimes.  These naval forces 
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are to have capability of interdicting and boarding vessels suspected of illegal 
activities.  Currently, the patrolling of the Gulf of Guinea by the regional navies has 
been inadequate.  As a result their waters are improperly governed and secured, 
thereby making the areas susceptible for maritime crimes.  On realization of this 
weakness in the region among other considerations, the USA has proposed the 
establishment of African Command Force (AFRICOM).  Undoubtedly, well integrated 
navies in the region into the AFRICOM, such as the proposed Gulf of Guinea Guards 
(GGG) will ensure improved infrastructure for these navies which would increase 
their effectiveness in patrolling their territorial waters to enhance maritime security.        
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CHAPTER 8 
 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
8.1. Conclusion 
 
The non-uniformity in the implementation of the international regulatory regimes by 
member States is attributed to the weaknesses in the definitions provided by the 
international regulations.  Thus, there have been different interpretations of these 
provisions in the national legislations of member States.  The significant variation in 
the standard of maritime security globally, has resulted in the increase of global acts 
of terrorism and piracy in the last fifteen years. 
 
This study identifies the motives of acts of terrorism and piracy as being political and 
financial gains respectively.  Furthermore, it establishes the human and economic 
impacts of these criminal acts on ships and ports.  Today’s use of sophisticated and 
lethal small arms as different from the traditional knives, crowbars and daggers used 
in the past has made pirates adamant during negotiations.  In addition, the pirates 
have demanded high ransoms for the release of their victims.  The money raised 
from acts of piracy has been linked with the funding of terrorism in some cases.     
 
The existing maritime security regimes include the UNCLOS, SOLAS and SUA 
Conventions and the ISPS Code; all these have been ineffective in combating acts of 
terrorism and piracy.  Furthermore, the ineffectiveness was contributed from the fact 
that their risk assessment has been based on safety measures.  This dissertation 
concludes that in combating terrorism, the risk assessment should be based on 
security measures instead of safety measures.   
 
The ISPS Code is based on maritime security assessment which is seen as 
appropriate for combating terrorism.  Nevertheless, the high cost of implementing the 
Code has made it difficult for developing countries to adopt it.  In the other cases 
examined, the ineffectiveness of the international regulations has resulted in the 
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development of the USA Maritime Security Initiatives, CMI Model Law and 
establishment of Maritime Component Force for the GWOT. 
Furthermore, this study identifies contributing factors for the lack of effectiveness of 
the ISPS Code on enhancing maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea over a period   
of 10 years to be that of corruption in government and failure of nationalizing 
international law.  This has resulted in the inadequacy of national law to address the 
issues of terrorism and piracy as well as a lack of maritime security infrastructure in 
the Gulf of Guinea countries.  Others are the lack of regional cooperation between 
the countries and the poor equipment of the Navies and Coast Guards in the region.  
The presence of the regional Navies at sea for the purposes of patrolling has been 
rare, thus making the territorial waters of this region unregulated and ungovernable. 
 
With the establishment of good governance in the countries of the Gulf of Guinea, 
this study suggests therefore that the proper domestication of the international 
regimes on maritime security is needed for the effective implementation of maritime 
law in the region.  Furthermore, with appropriate maritime tax collection, adequate 
funds are to be raised in off-setting the high cost of implementing maritime security 
regulations within the region. 
 
In partnership with Nigeria, the USA has played an important role in introducing 
RMAC to the Gulf of Guinea region.  This system provides the LRIT units which has 
a wider coverage area than the AIS units, however it was stated that effective 
utilization of them would enhance maritime security in the region.  Furthermore, the 
international community recommendation on the need for regional cooperation in 
ensuring effective implementation of security regimes has been adopted within the 
region.  As a result, the region has established MOWCA and GGC which have been 
promoting regional cooperation initiatives among the countries in the region to 
enhance maritime security. 
 
This study has indicated that ships and port facilities security initiatives contributed in 
combating the menace of acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships.  The 
initiatives included the measures on perimeter fencing, provisions of CCTV and 
armed guards for merchant ships.  However, it was indicated that the international 
community has discouraged the use of firearms and armed guards in combating 
piracy.  
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Training and retention of security personnel are vital measures taken in adequate 
capacity building to ensure effective implementation of maritime security regimes.  
Some training initiatives in the region by the US Naval Forces in Europe, USCG, RN 
and EU have been identified to involve workshops and sea exercises in the Gulf of 
Guinea.  In addition, this study stresses the important of a viable Naval Force in 
ensuring maritime security and the Force has been identified to be lacking in the Gulf 
of Guinea countries.  Furthermore, the lack of any presence of a regional Naval 
Force which has resulted in the irregular patrolling of the Gulf of Guinea waters, has 
made it unregulated as well as ungovernable and therefore a breach of maritime 
security.   
 
8.2. Recommendations 
 
To combat acts of terrorism, piracy and armed robbery against ships thereby 
ensuring maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, it is recommended that: 
 
? The international community should define sufficiently, the provisions of the 
acts of piracy and terrorism in the UNCLOS, SUA Convention and ISPS Code. 
? Gulf of Guinea countries should eliminate corrupt practices to enthrone good 
governance within the region. 
? International regimes on maritime security should be domesticated in the Gulf 
of Guinea. 
? CMI Model Law should be used for uniformly standardising domestic maritime 
security law in the Gulf of Guinea. 
? A special maritime security tax should be collected from international shipping 
in the Gulf of Guinea to off-set cost of implementing maritime law. 
? Regional cooperation for maritime security should be adhered to by the 
countries in the Gulf of Guinea. 
? Sovereignty of a nation in the Gulf of Guinea should not be a breach of 
maritime security in the region. 
? Adequate LRIT and AIS systems should be provided in the Gulf of Guinea. 
? Gulf of Guinea countries should embark on manpower training as well as the 
development of security personnel. 
? Regional Navies in the Gulf of Guinea should be patrolling the waters in the 
region regularly.   
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APPENDIX A 
 
GEOGRAPHIC LOCATION OF ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS ATTACKS FROM 1994 T0 2008 
Number of actual and attempted attacks annually   
Ser 
 
Regional Location 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (k) (l) (m) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) 
1. Africa/Gulf of Guinea 
Horn of Africa  
 
5 
 
7 
 
20 
 
86 
 
32 
 
41 
 
45 
 
66 
 
56 
 
72 
 
63 
 
35 
 
41 
 
76 
 
98 
2. Americas 11 21 32 37 35 28 39 21 65 72 45 25 29 21 14 
3. Indian Sub-continent 3 16 24 37 22 45 93 53 52 87 32 36 53 30 23 
4. Middle East/Red Sea 
Gulf of Aden/Yemen 
 
1 
 
14 
 
5 
 
10 
 
9 
 
14 
 
25 
 
23 
 
22 
 
24 
 
13 
 
57 
 
22 
 
48 
 
111 
5. Southeast Asia/  
Far East 
 
70 
 
118 
 
141 
 
111 
 
99 
 
167 
 
263 
 
169 
 
170 
 
189 
 
173 
 
122 
 
88 
 
80 
 
65 
6. Rest of the World - 13 6 17 5 5 4 3 5 1 3 1 6 8 2 
7. Total Annual Attacks 90 188 228 248 202 300 469 335 370 445 329 276 239 263 293 
58
Source:  Extract from IMB Annual reports from January 1994 to December 2008  
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Annual Trends in Overall Actual and Attempted Piratical Attacks from 1994 to 2008 Worldwide 
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Source:  IMB Annual Reports on Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships from 1994 to 2009.
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APPENDIX B 
REGIONAL TRENDS IN ACTS OF PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS FROM 1994 TO 2008 
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Source:  IMB Annual Reports from 1994 to 2009.
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APPENDIX C 
 
HOTSPOT AREAS CONTRIBUTING OVER 70 PER CENT OF GLOBAL PIRATICAL ATTACKS FROM 1994 TO 2008 
 
Number of actual and attempted attacks annually   
Ser 
 
Hotspot Areas 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (k) (l) (m) (o) (p) (q) (r) (s) 
1. Bangladesh  2 2 4 9 9 25 55 25 32 58 17 21 47 15 12 
2. Gulf  of Aden/Yemen - - 1 5 - - 14 12 17 18 8 10 10 16 92 
3. Indonesia 22 33 57 47 60 115 119 91 103 121 94 79 50 43 28 
4. Gulf of Guinea/Nigeria - 1 4 9 3 12 9 19 14 39 28 16 12 42 40 
5. Somalia 1 14 4 5 9 14 9 8 6 3 2 35 10 31 19 
6. Tanzania 1 2 3 4 3 3 2 7 3 5 2 7 9 11 14 
7. Vietnam 2 4 - 4 - 2 6 8 12 15 4 10 3 5 11 
8. Total Annual Attacks 28 56 73 83 84 171 214 170 187 262 155 178 141 163 216 
9. Per cent Overall  
Annually (approx) 
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61
Source:  IMB Annual reports from January 1994 to December 2008 
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Chart Showing the Distribution of the Incidents of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in 
Selected Hotspots Region/Country Contributing 70 Per cent Overall  
Bangladesh, 12Vietnam, 11
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Somalia, 19
Nigeria, 40
Indonesia, 28
Gulf of Aden, 92
Source:  IMB Annual Reports from 1994 to 2009.
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